The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement and its Position in the Emerging Global Financial Architecture

This policy brief analyzes the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), arguing that while it is currently more symbolic than a substantive challenge to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it has the potential to evolve into a more independent and comprehensive financial safety net for emerging economies.

• The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) is currently viewed as a symbolic and exploratory tool rather than a substantive alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and its limited scope may result in it playing a minor role in the global financial system.
• The CRA's primary objective is to provide a framework for liquidity and precautionary instruments to address actual or potential short-term balance of payments pressures, thereby strengthening the global financial safety net and complementing existing arrangements.
• The CRA has a total commitment of $100 billion, with China contributing the largest share at $41 billion, followed by Russia, Brazil, and India at $18 billion each, and South Africa at $5 billion.
• A significant limitation of the CRA is its linkage to the IMF: only 30% of the maximum amount a party can request is 'de-linked' (available via approval from other participants), while the remaining 70% is 'IMF-linked' and requires a conditionality-based agreement with the IMF.
• The CRA is governed by a Governing Council, which handles strategic direction and decisions by consensus, and a Standing Committee, which manages operational functions and uses a weighted voting system for support requests based on the value of each participant's commitment.
• Drawing on the experience of the ASEAN+3 Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), the authors suggest that the CRA must increase its size, eliminate the IMF-linked portion, and establish its own macroeconomic surveillance and research facility to become an effective safety net.

APA

o, N. C. A., k, M. A. Y. A. B. I. Z. I. W. I., & ER, D. A. V. I. F. R. Y. (2015). The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement and its Position in the Emerging Global Financial Architecture. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Policy-Insights-10.pdf

Chicago

o, NIColETTE C ATTANE, M A y AMIko B I z I w IC k, and D A v ID F R y ER. The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement and its Position in the Emerging Global Financial Architecture. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2015. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Policy-Insights-10.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=o |first1=NIColETTE C ATTANE |last2=k |first2=M A y AMIko B I z I w IC |last3=ER |first3=D A v ID F R y |title=The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement and its Position in the Emerging Global Financial Architecture |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=10 March 2015 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Policy-Insights-10.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{o2015brics, author = {o, NIColETTE C ATTANE and k, M A y AMIko B I z I w IC and ER, D A v ID F R y}, title = {{The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement and its Position in the Emerging Global Financial Architecture}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2015}, month = mar, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Policy-Insights-10.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }