China–South Sudan: Governance in Emerging Relations

This policy briefing examines the evolving governance-based relationship between China and South Sudan, arguing that the ability of both nations to move beyond oil-centric ties depends on overcoming administrative capacity gaps and establishing formal institutional mechanisms for development finance.

• A significant diplomatic tension arose from a 'so-called 8 billion dollar affair' in 2012, where South Sudan's Minister of Information announced a loan from China that had not been agreed upon. The Chinese government did not publicly confirm or deny the claim for nearly a year, with a special envoy only confirming in mid-March 2013 that the loan had not been offered.
• Mutual discontent followed the loan controversy: South Sudanese perceived China as lacking the political will to provide financial aid, while Chinese officials were frustrated by Juba's poor planning and failure to prioritize its needs. China also cited a lack of repayment guarantees and an aversion to 'blank cheque diplomacy'.
• A primary obstacle to development finance is the asymmetrical administrative and negotiating capacity between the two nations. South Sudan's lack of capability to negotiate complex financial deals has hindered the unlocking of finance that could support the state's prospects.
• China is engaging with South Sudanese governance through several channels, including inter-state relations, human resource development training, and formal party-to-party relations. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) has developed formalized links with the Communist Party of China (CPC), including governance training and delegations, such as an SPLM tour of China in November 2012 and a CPC visit to Juba in April 2013.
• To address capacity mismatches, South Sudan's Ministry of Finance and the Chinese embassy in Juba have worked to establish a 'China desk' and a working team with Exim Bank to manage the financial foundations of their economic relations.
• While many infrastructure projects have remained on paper due to economic austerity and a lack of finance, President Salva Kiir announced in April 2013 that a 'major loan scheme' had been agreed with China to fund electricity schemes, roads, and the Juba airport.
• The nature of China's engagement is shifting from promoting economic interests through political means to promoting political objectives through economic means. This deepening governance involvement in 'fragile states' like South Sudan occurs alongside, but is not overtly harmonized with, wider multilateral state-building efforts.

APA

Large, D. (2013). China–South Sudan: Governance in Emerging Relations. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Policy-Briefing-77.pdf

Chicago

Large, Daniel. China–South Sudan: Governance in Emerging Relations. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2013. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Policy-Briefing-77.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Large |first1=Daniel |title=China–South Sudan: Governance in Emerging Relations |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=November 2013 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Policy-Briefing-77.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{large2013chinasouth, author = {Large, Daniel}, title = {{China–South Sudan: Governance in Emerging Relations}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2013}, month = nov, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Policy-Briefing-77.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }