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This research paper analyzes South Africa's engagement with the BRICS bloc ahead of the Ufa summit, highlighting the lack of a concrete strategy to translate the grouping's general economic goals into tangible benefits for South African business and infrastructure.

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  • Russia is utilizing the BRICS summit to project itself as a global power, aiming to impress Central Asian neighbors and signal to the West that it has alternative platforms to challenge for global power. Russia's priorities are split between global security and politics, and economics, with a specific push to move beyond a general strategy to identify concrete trade and investment projects up to 2020.
  • The BRICS economic strategy focuses on three priorities: e-commerce coordination (where Russia proposed a working group), trade facilitation (centering on a virtual working group for trade and export promotion agencies and a single window for electronic trade processes), and intellectual property rights regimes (proposed by China).
  • South African business views the BRICS process as too bureaucratic and of limited use, noting that the government fails to address 'fair' trade issues. A primary concern is that South Africa has the lowest average import tariffs among BRICS members but implements the fewest nontariff barriers.
  • The Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) is insufficient to prevent a run on the rand, as South Africa's access is capped at $6.5bn (130% of its $5bn contribution), which is a small fraction of daily currency market turnover. Furthermore, the CRA cannot bypass IMF conditionalities, as its rules explicitly provide for IMF involvement.
  • South Africa is pursuing the establishment of the New Development Bank’s Africa Regional Centre, likely to be located in Johannesburg, to revive African infrastructure development. However, South Africa's decision to join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank may erode the effectiveness of both the New Development Bank and the Africa Regional Centre.

Cite the original document

APA
South African Institute of International Affairs (2015). South Africa needs a concrete BRICS strategy. https://saiia.org.za/research/south-africa-needs-a-concrete-brics-strategy/
Chicago
South African Institute of International Affairs. South Africa needs a concrete BRICS strategy. 2015. https://saiia.org.za/research/south-africa-needs-a-concrete-brics-strategy/.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=South Africa needs a concrete BRICS strategy |date=7 July 2015 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/south-africa-needs-a-concrete-brics-strategy/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2015south, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{South Africa needs a concrete BRICS strategy}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2015}, month = jul, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/south-africa-needs-a-concrete-brics-strategy/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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