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The briefing argues that South Africa does not unilaterally control SACU revenue or deliberately hinder the growth of other member states. It clarifies that recent funding decreases for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (BLNS) resulted from the 2008-2009 global recession rather than changes to the revenue sharing formula. The text highlights that South Africa contributes significantly more to the revenue pool than it receives, noting that in 2008/9 it contributed over ZAR45 billion but received just over ZAR21 billion. It further asserts that other SACU members, such as Namibia and Botswana, successfully attract their own investment and provide domestic industrial incentives. Finally, it frames South Africa's proposal to reform the revenue sharing formula as an effort to provide greater income stability for BLNS countries rather than an attempt to collapse the union.

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  • The SACU revenue sharing formula, implemented in 2006, has not changed in 2011; the reduction in funds for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (BLNS) is attributed to decreased global demand and commodity prices following the 2008 and 2009 global recession.
  • South Africa is a net contributor to the SACU revenue pool; in the 2008/9 period, it contributed over ZAR45 billion (98% of the pool) while receiving just over ZAR21 billion.
  • South Africa does not exclusively attract regional investment; Namibia has secured investments from China and Russia, including the N$2.5 billion Ohorongo Cement project, and Botswana provides assistance packages to local textile manufacturers.
  • The South African National Treasury's proposal to reform the revenue sharing formula is intended to increase the predictability and stability of income flows for BLNS countries by reducing the total reliance on trade-linked revenue.

Cite the original document

APA
South African Institute of International Affairs (2011). Southern African Customs Union: Myths and Reality. https://saiia.org.za/research/southern-african-customs-union-myths-and-reality/
Chicago
South African Institute of International Affairs. Southern African Customs Union: Myths and Reality. 2011. https://saiia.org.za/research/southern-african-customs-union-myths-and-reality/.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=Southern African Customs Union: Myths and Reality |date=23 March 2011 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/southern-african-customs-union-myths-and-reality/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2011southern, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{Southern African Customs Union: Myths and Reality}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2011}, month = mar, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/southern-african-customs-union-myths-and-reality/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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