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The author argues that President Ouattara lacks effective command and control over the rebel forces that helped him seize power, as these forces are fragmented and not inherently loyal to him. The military landscape is split between different rebel blocs and zone commanders, some of whom are under UN sanctions. Consequently, the author suggests that securing a monopoly on the use of force and negotiating the disarmament of these rebels is a more urgent priority for Ouattara than forming a government of national unity.

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  • President Ouattara does not possess actual command and control over the troops that entered Abidjan or those that operated in the west of the country during February and March.
  • The rebel forces are divided into two distinct blocks: one led by IB Coulibaly, who operated in the Abobo district, and a larger block nominally loyal to the military hierarchy and Prime Minister Guillaume Soro.
  • The military wing of the main rebel block consists of ten zone commanders who have ruled the north for over eight years; some, such as Fofie Kouakou, have been under UN sanctions since 2005.
  • Burkina Faso and its President Compaore provided backing to the rebels, though Compaore's relationship with the zone commanders has fluctuated and he has not always maintained control over them.
  • Before establishing a national unity government, Ouattara's most urgent and difficult task is to secure his position by achieving a working monopoly on the use of force and convincing the majority of rebels to disarm.

Cite the original document

APA
South African Institute of International Affairs (2011). Cote d'Ivoire: The Battle of Abidjan. https://saiia.org.za/research/cote-divoire-the-battle-of-abidjan/
Chicago
South African Institute of International Affairs. Cote d'Ivoire: The Battle of Abidjan. 2011. https://saiia.org.za/research/cote-divoire-the-battle-of-abidjan/.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=Cote d'Ivoire: The Battle of Abidjan |date=15 April 2011 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/cote-divoire-the-battle-of-abidjan/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2011cote, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{Cote d'Ivoire: The Battle of Abidjan}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2011}, month = apr, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/cote-divoire-the-battle-of-abidjan/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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