CLIMATE VOTES: THE GREAT DECEPTION

The report finds that asset managers largely fail to use their voting power to oppose fossil fuel expansion, often supporting the governance and strategies of climate-hostile companies. Despite public commitments to climate action, the analysis reveals that most asset managers' voting policies lack robust, action-oriented criteria and that their actual voting records show high support for the re-election of directors and remuneration of executives at companies pursuing expansion plans incompatible with a 1.5°C scenario.

• Asset managers frequently approve inadequate climate plans through 'Say on Climate' resolutions. In 2023, only two of the 75 assessed fossil fuel developers submitted such plans; both were approved by over 80% of shareholders despite being incompatible with a 1.5°C pathway.
• Climate-related shareholder resolutions are rare and seldom successful. In 2023, only 22 such resolutions were filed at 11 of the assessed companies, and only 9% (two resolutions) were approved.
• Proxy voting policies for climate resolutions are generally weak, prioritizing disclosure over concrete action. Only 7 of the 30 asset managers expect companies to align with a 1.5°C scenario, and only 2 expect them to end fossil fuel expansion plans.
• Asset managers use routine management-proposed votes to endorse the governance of climate-hostile companies. On average, they supported 78% of resolutions for the re-election of directors at fossil fuel developers.
• There is a significant lack of climate-related criteria in voting decisions regarding executive remuneration. Only one asset manager (abrdn) expects all companies to include climate-related criteria in variable remuneration for top management.
• Asset managers overwhelmingly approve financial statements that fail to integrate material climate-related risks, such as the risk of stranded assets. On average, they voted in favour of 88% of financial statements for fossil fuel developers.
• Asset managers rarely provide rationales for voting against management, and when they do, climate is seldom the primary reason. For director re-elections, only 8 asset managers disclosed at least one climate-related rationale.
• The practice of 'split voting' is used by 11 of the assessed asset managers, allowing different votes for the same resolution, which the report suggests asset owners should use to enforce their own climate policies.

APA

Masson, A. (2023). CLIMATE VOTES: THE GREAT DECEPTION. Reclaim Finance. https://reclaimfinance.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Reclaim-Finance_Climate-Votes-2023_VF-1.pdf

Chicago

Masson, Agathe. CLIMATE VOTES: THE GREAT DECEPTION. Reclaim Finance, 2023. https://reclaimfinance.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Reclaim-Finance_Climate-Votes-2023_VF-1.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Masson |first1=Agathe |title=CLIMATE VOTES: THE GREAT DECEPTION |publisher=Reclaim Finance |date=December 2023 |url=https://reclaimfinance.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Reclaim-Finance_Climate-Votes-2023_VF-1.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{masson2023climate, author = {Masson, Agathe}, title = {{CLIMATE VOTES: THE GREAT DECEPTION}}, institution = {Reclaim Finance}, year = {2023}, month = dec, url = {https://reclaimfinance.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Reclaim-Finance_Climate-Votes-2023_VF-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }