The Politics of Corruption

The author argues that corruption in South Africa is driven by a conflict between a liberal view of the state (emphasising neutrality) and the ANC's National Democratic Revolution (NDR) view, which seeks to transform the state to serve the black majority. This tension creates a 'situational logic' where deviation from formal public service rules is justified to achieve political goals like Black Economic Empowerment. The author further contends that rising corruption is not merely a moral failure but evidence of 'weak institutions'—organisations lacking the cohesion, processes, and stability to produce a 'universal' public good. The paper concludes that the remedy for corruption in South Africa lies in state-building rather than simple policing.

• Corruption in South Africa is influenced by the ANC's rejection of a liberal, neutral state in favour of a National Democratic Revolution (NDR) approach, which views the state as a tool to serve the interests of "Blacks in general and Africans in particular".
• A 'situational logic' has emerged where 'misuse' or 'deviation' from formal public sector processes is seen as necessary to achieve the political and economic goals of the National Liberation Movement (NLM), such as Black Economic Empowerment.
• The ANC's recent recognition of corruption as a problem reflects a loss of control over class formation, where a 'new type of cadre' pursues self-interest through factionalism and 'palace politics' rather than the movement's broader societal goals.
• Corruption is often legitimised by public servants on moral grounds, such as providing for family or correcting perceived systemic unfairness, rather than being driven solely by personal greed.
• Widespread non-compliance in the public sector is a result of 'weak institutions' characterized by a lack of basic administrative processes, high senior staff turnover, and a disregard for laws and regulations.
• The author distinguishes between three types of institutions: 'efficient' (pursuing the public good neutrally), 'captured' (servicing particular interests), and 'weak' (incapable of producing a universal public good due to a lack of common 'rules of the game').

APA

Chipkin, I. (2012). The Politics of Corruption. Public Affairs Research Institute. https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/PARI-L.E.3-The-Politics-of-Corruption-Two-Competing-Definitions-Oct-20121.pdf

Chicago

Chipkin, Ivor. The Politics of Corruption. Public Affairs Research Institute, 2012. https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/PARI-L.E.3-The-Politics-of-Corruption-Two-Competing-Definitions-Oct-20121.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Chipkin |first1=Ivor |title=The Politics of Corruption |publisher=Public Affairs Research Institute |date=October 2012 |url=https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/PARI-L.E.3-The-Politics-of-Corruption-Two-Competing-Definitions-Oct-20121.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{chipkin2012politics, author = {Chipkin, Ivor}, title = {{The Politics of Corruption}}, institution = {Public Affairs Research Institute}, year = {2012}, month = oct, url = {https://pari.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/PARI-L.E.3-The-Politics-of-Corruption-Two-Competing-Definitions-Oct-20121.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }