Switzerland's bilateral agreements to offset their emissions set a poor precedent for ambition
Summary
The NewClimate Institute criticizes Switzerland's bilateral climate agreements with Georgia, Peru, Senegal, and Ghana, arguing that by targeting 'low-hanging fruit' (low-cost emission reductions), Switzerland avoids domestic decarbonization while potentially blocking host countries from meeting their own Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The author contends that for market mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement to be effective, they must focus on 'high-hanging fruit'—hard-to-abate emissions that require external finance—and that Switzerland should instead prioritize fulfilling its fair share of international climate finance without claiming ownership of the resulting emission reductions.
Key insights
- Switzerland has entered into bilateral agreements with Georgia, Peru, Senegal, and Ghana to support low-cost climate mitigation in exchange for the transfer of mitigation outcomes to help Switzerland meet its Paris Agreement targets. The author argues these agreements do not signal a need for decarbonization within Switzerland and may limit the host countries' ability to raise their own future ambitions or implement their NDCs.
- The agreement with Georgia specifically targets energy efficiency retrofits for large public buildings, which the document identifies as one of Georgia's most accessible mitigation options. Because these projects have low or even negative abatement costs and are already part of Georgia's national legislation and NDC implementation plan, they fail to provide a meaningful price signal for Switzerland to reduce its own emissions or to represent an increase in ambition for Georgia.
- The document asserts that for market mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement to function as 'ambition raising mechanisms' rather than 'flexibility mechanisms', they must meet two criteria: abatement costs must be high enough to incentivize domestic decarbonization in the buying country, and projects must not conflict with the host country's own climate goals.
- Switzerland is criticized for failing to meet its fair share of international climate finance. Citing ODI analysis, the document states that Switzerland's contributions are 38% below its fair share of the goal to mobilize USD 100 billion annually in public international climate finance, a finding echoed by Climate Action Tracker's assessment that its contributions are 'highly insufficient'.
Cite the original document
- APA
- NewClimate Institute (2021). Switzerland's bilateral agreements to offset their emissions set a poor precedent for ambition. http://www.newclimate.org/news/switzerlands-bilateral-agreements-to-offset-their-emissions-set-a-poor-precedent-for-ambition
- Chicago
- NewClimate Institute. Switzerland's bilateral agreements to offset their emissions set a poor precedent for ambition. 2021. http://www.newclimate.org/news/switzerlands-bilateral-agreements-to-offset-their-emissions-set-a-poor-precedent-for-ambition.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite press release |author=NewClimate Institute |title=Switzerland's bilateral agreements to offset their emissions set a poor precedent for ambition |date=28 October 2021 |url=http://www.newclimate.org/news/switzerlands-bilateral-agreements-to-offset-their-emissions-set-a-poor-precedent-for-ambition |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @misc{newclimateinstitute2021switzerlands, author = {{NewClimate Institute}}, title = {{Switzerland's bilateral agreements to offset their emissions set a poor precedent for ambition}}, publisher = {NewClimate Institute}, year = {2021}, month = oct, url = {http://www.newclimate.org/news/switzerlands-bilateral-agreements-to-offset-their-emissions-set-a-poor-precedent-for-ambition}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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