Democracy Business Interests Myths and risks of the EU-Myanmar Investment Protection Agreement

Report an error

Summary

AI-generated

This summary is written by a language model reading the source document. It is not the publisher's words and is not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment

The document warns that the EU-Myanmar Investment Protection Agreement could bankrupt Myanmar through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) lawsuits and hinder its ability to implement essential social and environmental regulations.

Key insights

AI-generated

These insights are written by a language model reading the source document. They are not the publisher's words and are not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment
  • There is no evidence that investment protection agreements, such as the proposed IPA, are decisive in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI); research indicates that the rule of law and strong legal frameworks are more important incentives.
  • The IPA's sustainable development chapter is likely ineffective because it contains only voluntary, aspirational commitments without binding obligations for investors or enforcement mechanisms for states.
  • The agreement allows EU investors to sue the Myanmar government via international arbitration if new regulations—such as those protecting public health, water access, or the environment—impact their profits, potentially leading to 'regulatory chill'.
  • The financial burden of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases, including high legal fees and multi-billion dollar awards, could severely impact Myanmar's scarce public budget, which already faces a deficit of 4.52 percent of GDP.
  • The IPA could obstruct Myanmar's peace process and transition to a federal system by locking in current policies and making it costly to reform natural resource management and land-grabbing issues in ethnic areas.
  • By allowing investors to bypass national courts, the IPA removes the incentive for the Myanmar government to strengthen its own national judicial system and the rule of law.
  • The negotiations for the EU-Myanmar IPA have been characterized by a lack of transparency, with secret rounds and restricted access to texts even for Members of the European Parliament.

Cite the original document

APA
Misereor (2017). Democracy Business Interests Myths and risks of the EU-Myanmar Investment Protection Agreement. https://www.misereor.org/fileadmin/user_upload_misereororg/publication/en/shaping_economic_processes/POLICY_BRIEF_EU-Myanmar.pdf
Chicago
Misereor. Democracy Business Interests Myths and risks of the EU-Myanmar Investment Protection Agreement. 2017. https://www.misereor.org/fileadmin/user_upload_misereororg/publication/en/shaping_economic_processes/POLICY_BRIEF_EU-Myanmar.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Misereor |title=Democracy Business Interests Myths and risks of the EU-Myanmar Investment Protection Agreement |date=September 2017 |url=https://www.misereor.org/fileadmin/user_upload_misereororg/publication/en/shaping_economic_processes/POLICY_BRIEF_EU-Myanmar.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document misereor-000246)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{misereor2017democracy, author = {{Misereor}}, title = {{Democracy Business Interests Myths and risks of the EU-Myanmar Investment Protection Agreement}}, institution = {Misereor}, year = {2017}, month = sep, url = {https://www.misereor.org/fileadmin/user_upload_misereororg/publication/en/shaping_economic_processes/POLICY_BRIEF_EU-Myanmar.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document misereor-000246} }

Full text

Collected · Record updated