Monitoring Disinformation and Influence Campaigns in the 2022 French Elections: Lessons Learnt

The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) monitored the 2022 French elections, finding that while Russian state-backed influence was limited due to EU bans, domestic non-state actors and far-right figures effectively leveraged social media to spread anti-establishment narratives. Key tactics included coordinated inauthentic behaviour by Éric Zemmour's campaign, the cross-platform monetisation of fake vaccination passes, and the mainstreaming of the 'Great Replacement' conspiracy theory. The report highlights significant gaps in platform content moderation, particularly regarding online abuse of candidates and voter fraud narratives, and recommends stronger regulatory oversight and data transparency from social media companies.

• The campaign of far-right candidate Éric Zemmour employed coordinated inauthentic behaviour to amplify his agenda. ISD identified twelve petitions created by 'Les Amis d’Éric Zemmour' between January 2021 and June 2022, noting that sharing patterns on Twitter indicated inauthentic mobilisation, particularly in the weeks preceding the election.
• Malign actors used cross-platform strategies to disseminate and monetise disinformation, specifically regarding fake vaccination passes. Actors used mainstream platforms like Facebook and Instagram to attract users and then redirected them to encrypted or closed spaces such as Telegram and WhatsApp to complete transactions.
• The 2022 elections saw a shift from state-led to non-state influence. While the EU-wide ban on Russian state media limited the impact of Russia-backed actors, domestic sovereigntist and far-right figures used their large audiences to fuel distrust in institutions by embracing anti-vaccine sentiment and pro-Russian content following the invasion of Ukraine.
• Far-right Identitarian ideas, specifically the 'Great Replacement' conspiracy theory, were moved into mainstream public discourse. This was driven by Éric Zemmour's candidacy and manifesto, as well as inauthentic online tactics like astroturfing and the coordinated promotion of petitions.
• Online abuse and incivility targeting candidates became a normalised political tactic. ISD found that for most candidates, abusive comments represented 15% to 25% of all comments on Facebook, with women and minoritised candidates disproportionately targeted with racist and misogynistic abuse.
• Voter fraud narratives, imported from the US 'Stop the Steal' movement, emerged in France. These claims were amplified by fringe political figures such as Florian Philippot, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, and François Asselineau, though they had limited reach on mainstream social media compared to other political scandals.
• Social media platforms demonstrated inconsistent enforcement of their own terms of service. ISD found that Twitter failed to label voter fraud statements by high-profile public figures as 'misleading', and Meta failed to label similar allegations regarding voting machines.

APA

Simmons, C., Gatewood, C., & Fourel, Z. (2022). Monitoring Disinformation and Influence Campaigns in the 2022 French Elections: Lessons Learnt. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Monitoring-Disinformation-and-Influence-Campaigns-in-the-2022-French-Elections_Lessons-Learnt.pdf

Chicago

Simmons, Cécile, Cooper Gatewood, and Zoé Fourel. Monitoring Disinformation and Influence Campaigns in the 2022 French Elections: Lessons Learnt. Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2022. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Monitoring-Disinformation-and-Influence-Campaigns-in-the-2022-French-Elections_Lessons-Learnt.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Simmons |first1=Cécile |last2=Gatewood |first2=Cooper |last3=Fourel |first3=Zoé |title=Monitoring Disinformation and Influence Campaigns in the 2022 French Elections: Lessons Learnt |publisher=Institute for Strategic Dialogue |date=2022 |url=https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Monitoring-Disinformation-and-Influence-Campaigns-in-the-2022-French-Elections_Lessons-Learnt.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{simmons2022monitoring, author = {Simmons, Cécile and Gatewood, Cooper and Fourel, Zoé}, title = {{Monitoring Disinformation and Influence Campaigns in the 2022 French Elections: Lessons Learnt}}, institution = {Institute for Strategic Dialogue}, year = {2022}, url = {https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Monitoring-Disinformation-and-Influence-Campaigns-in-the-2022-French-Elections_Lessons-Learnt.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }