ISIS and Nusra in Turkey

The report examines the recruitment of Turkish citizens into ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, identifying a total of 2,000 to 2,200 Turkish nationals who travelled to Iraq and Syria. It distinguishes between the recruitment styles of the two groups, noting that ISIS attracts more recruits through 'pop jihadist' propaganda and lower entry barriers, while Nusra relies on disciplined, historical al-Qaeda networks. Key push factors include personal alienation and socio-economic dislocation, particularly in Kurdish-majority areas and neighbourhoods affected by urban renewal. Pull factors include online Turkish-language propaganda, opposition to the Assad regime, and a specific focus on opposing the PKK. The report also details Ankara's response, including police outreach and Diyanet sermons, while noting the government's framing of the issue as a global problem driven by the Syrian regime and ineffective Western cooperation.

• The Soufan Group estimates that between 2,000 and 2,200 Turkish nationals have travelled to join jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria, making Turkey the fourth highest contributor of foreign fighters to these conflicts.
• ISIS has recruited significantly more Turkish nationals than Jabhat al-Nusra, partly due to a less rigorous selection process and the use of high-production 'pop jihadist' propaganda.
• Jabhat al-Nusra recruitment is more disciplined and relies heavily on historical al-Qaeda networks from previous conflicts in Afghanistan and Bosnia, often requiring recruits to undergo a three-week ideological indoctrination course in Turkey.
• Socio-economic dislocation and environmental factors, such as urban renewal in Ankara's Sincan and Hacibayram neighbourhoods or Istanbul's Bagcilar and Sultanbeyli, serve as key push factors for recruitment.
• There is a disproportionate number of ethnic Kurdish recruits, driven by low human development indicators and socio-economic dislocation in Kurdish-majority regions like Bingol and Adiyaman.
• Turkish-language propaganda for both groups emphasizes opposition to the PKK, but ISIS has adopted an increasingly confrontational stance against the Turkish state, labeling the government and President Erdogan as 'tagut' (impious idolaters).
• Personalized networks, including family, co-workers, and religious discussion circles (sohbet halkalari), are primary recruitment channels, with some areas like Akcakale in Sanliurfa seeing up to 70% of Nusra recruits coming from the same extended family.
• Ankara's counter-violent extremism (CVE) efforts include a National Police outreach program and a Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) program that delivers anti-terrorism sermons to mosques.
• The Turkish government frames jihadist recruitment as a global phenomenon primarily caused by the brutality of Bashar al-Assad's regime and exacerbated by ineffective Western cooperation and a failure to recognize the PKK as an equal threat to ISIS.

APA

Marks, M. (2016). ISIS and Nusra in Turkey. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ISIS_and_Nusra_in_Turkey_Jihadist_recruit_2019-amendment.pdf

Chicago

Marks, Monica. ISIS and Nusra in Turkey. Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ISIS_and_Nusra_in_Turkey_Jihadist_recruit_2019-amendment.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Marks |first1=Monica |title=ISIS and Nusra in Turkey |publisher=Institute for Strategic Dialogue |date=2016 |url=https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ISIS_and_Nusra_in_Turkey_Jihadist_recruit_2019-amendment.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{marks2016isis, author = {Marks, Monica}, title = {{ISIS and Nusra in Turkey}}, institution = {Institute for Strategic Dialogue}, year = {2016}, url = {https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ISIS_and_Nusra_in_Turkey_Jihadist_recruit_2019-amendment.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }