REGIONAL GOVERNORS: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY DO THE BENEFITS OF APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OUTWEIGH THE LOSS OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION?
Summary
The document argues that the presidential appointment of Regional Governors in Namibia undermines democratic representation and decentralisation without providing clear evidence of improved regional governance or service delivery.
Key insights
- The Special Advisors and Regional Governors Appointment Amendment Act (Act 15 of 2010) centralises regional leadership by mandating that the President appoint a Governor for every region who serves at the President's pleasure.
- The Second Regional Councils Amendment Act (Act 16 of 2010) separates the role of the Regional Governor from the Chairperson of the Regional Council, stipulating that the appointed Governor may attend and deliberate in council meetings but has no right to vote.
- Critics argue that the appointment system is a reversal of democratic practices and contradicts Namibia's decentralisation policy, effectively shifting authority back to the center (deconcentration).
- Proponents of the Act, including President Hage Geingob, argue that presidential appointments strengthen the unitary nature of the state and prevent 'divisive forces' or tribal tendencies from creating unrest.
- Between 2010 and 2015, appointed Regional Governors operated without clear Terms of Reference, performance evaluations, or Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) frameworks, making it impossible to determine if the system improved regional development.
- The 2014 Afrobarometer Survey for Namibia indicates low public trust and high perceptions of corruption among both elected regional councillors and appointed regional governors, with 53% of respondents stating 'some' elected councillors were involved in corruption and 53% saying 'some' appointed governors were corrupt.
- In both the 2010 and 2015 appointment rounds, all appointed Governors were members of the ruling Swapo Party, regardless of whether opposition parties held the majority of seats in the respective Regional Councils (as seen in the Kunene region).
- President Geingob introduced new Terms of Reference for the 2015-2020 term, including the requirement for a yearly State of the Region Address and the intention to tie performance to specific obligations.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Shejavali, N. (2015). REGIONAL GOVERNORS: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY DO THE BENEFITS OF APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OUTWEIGH THE LOSS OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION? Institute for Public Policy Research. https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Briefing%202%20Regional%20Governors_0.pdf
- Chicago
- Shejavali, Nangula. REGIONAL GOVERNORS: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY DO THE BENEFITS OF APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OUTWEIGH THE LOSS OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION? Institute for Public Policy Research, 2015. https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Briefing%202%20Regional%20Governors_0.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Shejavali |first1=Nangula |title=REGIONAL GOVERNORS: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY DO THE BENEFITS OF APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OUTWEIGH THE LOSS OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION? |publisher=Institute for Public Policy Research |date=November 2015 |url=https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Briefing%202%20Regional%20Governors_0.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ipprna-000066)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{shejavali2015regional, author = {Shejavali, Nangula}, title = {{REGIONAL GOVERNORS: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY DO THE BENEFITS OF APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OUTWEIGH THE LOSS OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION?}}, institution = {Institute for Public Policy Research}, year = {2015}, month = nov, url = {https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Briefing%202%20Regional%20Governors_0.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ipprna-000066} }
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