Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector
Summary
The document examines the intersection of business and conflict in Afghanistan, noting how a 'war economy' dominated by warlords and narcotics hindered formal growth. It analyzes the role of the private sector in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme and the limited impact of diaspora investments. While some business-warlord alliances reduced immediate violence, they created 'mafia-like networks' that obstruct long-term stability. The report concludes that systemic corruption, a 'brain drain' to NGOs, and a lack of law and order prevent the private sector from playing a conscious role in peacebuilding.
Key insights
- The Afghan economy was heavily shaped by different regional models of warlordism during the 1990s. In western Afghanistan (Herat), Ismail Khan established a traditional Islamic emirate funded by customs revenue from Iran. In the north, entrepreneurs required relationships with dominant factions like Junbesh-i Milli to prosper, while the northeast saw middle-ranking warlords focus on the drug trade due to a lack of large cities.
- The drug economy became a primary driver of political instability and state capture. Poppy cultivation grew massively during the jihad, covering 41,000 hectares by 1990 and reaching 74,000 hectares by 2002 after a brief Taliban ban. This profitability incentivized warlords and strongmen to seize state structures after 2001 to protect their interests in the trade.
- The legal economy in 2004, with an annual GDP of $5 billion, was dominated by trade and agriculture, but faced severe structural constraints. Agriculture accounted for 64 percent of GDP, while trade (6 percent) and industry (9 percent) were limited by a lack of credit from Afghan banks and poor infrastructure. The informal sector represented 80-90 percent of the total economy.
- Alliances between the military class and entrepreneurs helped prevent a return to 1990s-style conflict but created long-term risks. While these relationships made some strongmen less rapacious, they fostered 'mafia-like networks' of investors, politicians, and police who used intimidation to gain competitive advantages, excluding other businessmen from the market.
- The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme's attempt to engage the private sector had limited success. While 22 percent of demobilised fighters opted to start businesses—mostly small grocery shops—failure rates are estimated between 60-80 percent due to small start-up grants ($700) and poor credit management. Many businesses were seen as a political concession rather than a sustainable economic strategy.
- Afghan diaspora investments did not meet international expectations. Although diaspora Afghans are estimated to be worth $5 billion, most registered projects—valued at nearly $1 billion by May 2005—never materialised. Investors were deterred by an 'oppressive bureaucracy', lack of law and order, and competition from warlords-turned-businessmen.
- International reconstruction efforts often sidelined local businesses, favoring foreign firms. By the end of 2004, $3 billion in contracts were awarded, but local companies were mostly relegated to sub-contractors with reduced profit margins. This was exacerbated by a 'brain drain' where skilled Afghans left the private sector for higher-paying roles in NGOs and international organisations.
- Isolated attempts by businessmen to mobilise against corruption occurred in the provinces, but lacked support. In Teluqan, a shura was formed in 2004 to fight corruption, and in Faizabad, businessmen challenged the misrule of the circle associated with Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani. Both initiatives were marginalised due to a lack of response from the central government and international community.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Giustozzi, A. (2006). Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector. International Alert. https://www.international-alert.org/app/uploads/2021/10/11_section_2_Afghanistan.pdf
- Chicago
- Giustozzi, Antonio. Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector. International Alert, 2006. https://www.international-alert.org/app/uploads/2021/10/11_section_2_Afghanistan.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Giustozzi |first1=Antonio |title=Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector |publisher=International Alert |date=2006 |url=https://www.international-alert.org/app/uploads/2021/10/11_section_2_Afghanistan.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document intalert-000042)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{giustozzi2006local, author = {Giustozzi, Antonio}, title = {{Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector}}, institution = {International Alert}, year = {2006}, url = {https://www.international-alert.org/app/uploads/2021/10/11_section_2_Afghanistan.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document intalert-000042} }
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