Négociations de l’OMC sur les subventions à la pêche : État d’avancement des travaux

The document provides a detailed update on the WTO negotiations to discipline fisheries subsidies, focusing on three main pillars: illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; overexploited stocks; and overcapacity and overfishing. It examines the proposed legal frameworks, the role of Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) for developing nations, and institutional questions regarding transparency, dispute settlement, and the legal form of the eventual instrument.

• The proposed scope of the WTO instrument is limited to marine capture fisheries and sea-fishing related activities, explicitly excluding aquaculture and inland fisheries.
• There is general convergence on a complete prohibition of subsidies for IUU fishing, with the definition of IUU fishing based on the FAO's 2001 International Plan of Action (IPOA-IUU).
• Negotiators are debating which entities can trigger IUU subsidy prohibitions, with options including coastal States, flag States, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs), the subsidizing Member itself, or port States.
• For overexploited stocks, the summary text proposes prohibiting subsidies only when a stock is not recovering or continues to decline, unless the Member can prove that management measures are in place to ensure recovery.
• Regarding overcapacity and overfishing, the proposed approach focuses on prohibiting subsidies for equipment costs and operating costs in situations where fishing rates exceed sustainable levels defined by the coastal State or RFMO.
• The document identifies three main approaches to addressing overcapacity: qualitative prohibitions based on lists, quantitative limits (caps) on total subsidies, or a combination of both.
• Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) for developing countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is highly contested, with proposals including total exemptions for LDCs on overcapacity, and geographic exceptions for fishing within 12 nautical miles of the coast.
• Institutional options for the final instrument include creating a new fisheries subsidies committee, expanding the existing Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), or creating a subsidiary body under the SCM Committee.
• There is a consensus that WTO dispute settlement panels should not conduct a de novo review of fisheries management decisions, such as IUU determinations or stock assessments, but rather focus on procedural regularity or scientific data.

APA

Tipping, A., & Irschlinger, T. (2020). Négociations de l’OMC sur les subventions à la pêche : État d’avancement des travaux. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2020-08/wto-negotiations-fisheries-state-play-fr.pdf

Chicago

Tipping, Alice, and Tristan Irschlinger. Négociations de l’OMC sur les subventions à la pêche : État d’avancement des travaux. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2020. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2020-08/wto-negotiations-fisheries-state-play-fr.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Tipping |first1=Alice |last2=Irschlinger |first2=Tristan |title=Négociations de l’OMC sur les subventions à la pêche : État d’avancement des travaux |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |date=August 2020 |url=https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2020-08/wto-negotiations-fisheries-state-play-fr.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{tipping2020ngociations, author = {Tipping, Alice and Irschlinger, Tristan}, title = {{Négociations de l’OMC sur les subventions à la pêche : État d’avancement des travaux}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, year = {2020}, month = aug, url = {https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2020-08/wto-negotiations-fisheries-state-play-fr.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }