Las indemnizaciones en el marco de los tratados de inversión: ¿qué problemas existen y qué se puede hacer al respecto?

The document argues that current investment treaty compensation practices lead to excessively high awards, often based on speculative future earnings rather than actual losses. It highlights the use of the discounted cash flow (DCF) method as a primary driver of these high costs and notes that tribunals often ignore contextual factors like public interest or state capacity to pay. To address this, the authors suggest reforms such as limiting compensation to actual investment amounts or aligning awards with the host state's domestic laws.

• Compensation amounts in investment treaty arbitrations have increased significantly, with 50 known cases where tribunals ordered payments exceeding USD 100 million and eight cases exceeding USD 1,000 million. The highest single award mentioned is USD 40,000 million in the Hulley vs. Russia case.
• Tribunals frequently award high compensation for 'planned investments' that were never actually developed. In the Tethyan Copper vs. Pakistan case, an award of USD 4,000 million plus interest was based on estimated revenues over a 50-year cycle for a mine that was never established.
• The prevalence of the discounted cash flow (DCF) method for calculating future expected revenues departs from previously accepted international law principles and World Bank guidelines. This method is described as complex and costly, often requiring expensive financial experts; for example, in Tethyan Copper vs. Pakistan, the claimant spent USD 4.5 million on financial experts and USD 17.5 million in legal fees during the compensation phase.
• Current compensation principles are 'all or nothing' and generally ignore critical contextual factors, such as the public interest justification for a measure (e.g., the Netherlands' decision to close coal plants for a clean energy transition), investor misconduct, or the host state's capacity to pay.
• The authors propose four reform options for states: 1) balancing multiple factors (including public interest and past profits) as seen in SADC, COMESA, and PAIC models; 2) limiting compensation to the actual amount invested; 3) limiting compensation to the lower of the state's gain or the investor's expenses; or 4) applying the host state's domestic laws.

APA

Bonnitcha, J., & Brewin, S. (2020). Las indemnizaciones en el marco de los tratados de inversión: ¿qué problemas existen y qué se puede hacer al respecto? International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2021-01/compensation-investment-treaties-es.pdf

Chicago

Bonnitcha, Jonathan, and Sarah Brewin. Las indemnizaciones en el marco de los tratados de inversión: ¿qué problemas existen y qué se puede hacer al respecto? International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2020. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2021-01/compensation-investment-treaties-es.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Bonnitcha |first1=Jonathan |last2=Brewin |first2=Sarah |title=Las indemnizaciones en el marco de los tratados de inversión: ¿qué problemas existen y qué se puede hacer al respecto? |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |date=December 2020 |url=https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2021-01/compensation-investment-treaties-es.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{bonnitcha2020las, author = {Bonnitcha, Jonathan and Brewin, Sarah}, title = {{Las indemnizaciones en el marco de los tratados de inversión: ¿qué problemas existen y qué se puede hacer al respecto?}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, year = {2020}, month = dec, url = {https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2021-01/compensation-investment-treaties-es.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }