Le mécanisme de règlement des différends entre États dans les traités d’investissement
Summary
The guide analyzes state-to-state dispute settlement in investment treaties, detailing judicial, quasi-judicial, and arbitral forms. It explores three types of claims—diplomatic protection, interpretation, and declaratory judgments—using case studies like Italy v. Cuba and Ecuador v. United States. It also discusses the complex relationship between state-to-state and investor-state mechanisms, particularly under the ICSID Convention, and offers best practices for treaty drafting to increase predictability and state control over treaty interpretation.
Key insights
- State-to-state dispute settlement has seen a resurgence in interest as an alternative to investor-state arbitration, which has grown from 51 cases in 2000 to 568 by the end of 2013.
- State-to-state mechanisms generally take three forms: judicial (such as the International Court of Justice or regional courts), quasi-judicial (like the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement's system), and the most frequent, arbitral procedures.
- Claims under state-to-state clauses are categorized into three types: diplomatic protection (seeking reparation for investors), requests for interpretation (clarifying treaty meaning), and declaratory judgments (establishing if a measure violates the treaty).
- In the case of Italy v. Cuba (2003), the tribunal ruled that diplomatic protection is complementary to investor-state arbitration and can be exercised if the investor has not already consented to or initiated investor-state arbitration.
- The case of Ecuador v. United States (2011) established that a state's silence in response to a request for interpretation does not constitute a 'dispute' sufficient to trigger the jurisdiction of an interstate arbitral tribunal.
- Declaratory judgments allow a state to establish that a measure is in violation of a treaty without needing to prove that specific investors were affected or that internal remedies were exhausted, as seen in Mexico v. United States (2000).
- Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention generally prohibits a state from granting diplomatic protection or making an international claim for a dispute that its nationals and another contracting state have consented to submit to ICSID arbitration, except in cases of non-compliance with an award.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N. (2014). Le mécanisme de règlement des différends entre États dans les traités d’investissement. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-treaties-fr.pdf
- Chicago
- Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Nathalie. Le mécanisme de règlement des différends entre États dans les traités d’investissement. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2014. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-treaties-fr.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Bernasconi-Osterwalder |first1=Nathalie |title=Le mécanisme de règlement des différends entre États dans les traités d’investissement |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |date=October 2014 |url=https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-treaties-fr.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{bernasconiosterwalder2014mcanisme, author = {Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Nathalie}, title = {{Le mécanisme de règlement des différends entre États dans les traités d’investissement}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, year = {2014}, month = oct, url = {https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-treaties-fr.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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