L’extinction des traités bilatéraux d’investissement

The document analyzes the increasing trend of states terminating old-generation bilateral investment treaties (BITs) due to perceived imbalances in the investment regime. It details the legal mechanisms for termination under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, compares 'tacit renewal' and 'fixed-term' termination clauses, and discusses the impact of 'survival clauses' (sunset clauses). The guide outlines three primary paths for termination: mutual consent (with or without renegotiation), multilateral instruments, and unilateral denunciation. It provides strategic advice on neutralizing survival clauses and recommends that states actively track key treaty dates to avoid missing narrow termination windows.

• There is a growing trend of states terminating old-generation BITs, with the number of effective terminations exceeding new treaty signatures for the first time in 2017, when 22 terminations took effect compared to 18 new treaties.
• BIT termination clauses generally follow two main models: 'tacit renewal' (where treaties automatically renew unless terminated within a short window, often six months) and 'fixed-term' (where treaties remain in force for a set period, after which they can be terminated with a notice period, typically one year).
• Survival clauses allow BITs to produce legal effects for a defined period after termination, typically between 10 and 20 years, enabling investors to initiate international arbitration for investments made before the termination date.
• States use various methods to terminate BITs: 63% are replaced by a new treaty, 28% are terminated unilaterally without replacement, and 9% are terminated jointly without replacement, according to a 2017 UNCTAD study of 212 terminated BITs.
• Recent state practice shows that survival clauses can be neutralized or shortened through mutual consent, either as part of a new treaty or via separate agreements. Examples include the Canada-EU CETA, which replaced survival clauses with a three-year limit for dispute settlement.
• Unilateral termination requires diplomatic notification and is subject to the treaty's specific provisions; if a 'tacit renewal' window is missed, a state may have to wait another 10 or 15 years to terminate unless the partner agrees to an early exit.
• Newer BIT models are adopting more flexible termination and survival terms, such as the 2004 Canadian model's indefinite duration with unilateral denunciation at any time, or the 2015 Indian model's fixed term without tacit renewal and a shorter five-year survival period.

APA

Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N., & Brewin, S. (2020). L’extinction des traités bilatéraux d’investissement. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/terminating-treaty-best-practices-fr.pdf

Chicago

Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Nathalie, and Sarah Brewin. L’extinction des traités bilatéraux d’investissement. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2020. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/terminating-treaty-best-practices-fr.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Bernasconi-Osterwalder |first1=Nathalie |last2=Brewin |first2=Sarah |title=L’extinction des traités bilatéraux d’investissement |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |date=March 2020 |url=https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/terminating-treaty-best-practices-fr.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{bernasconiosterwalder2020lextinction, author = {Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Nathalie and Brewin, Sarah}, title = {{L’extinction des traités bilatéraux d’investissement}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, year = {2020}, month = mar, url = {https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/terminating-treaty-best-practices-fr.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }