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Addressing the Development Dimension of an Overcapacity and Overfishing Subsidy Discipline in the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations

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This research paper by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) analyzes various proposed regulatory approaches to prohibit fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing within the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. It specifically examines how to balance environmental sustainability with the development priorities of developing and least-developed countries, including food security and poverty reduction.

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  • The WTO fisheries subsidies mandate requires a balance between three policy priorities: the sustainability of fish stocks, poverty reduction (including livelihoods and food security), and broader development priorities, such as the ability of developing members to build larger fishing fleets.
  • List-based approaches propose prohibiting specific types of subsidies, such as those targeting capital and operating costs of vessels. Proposals include complete exclusions for least-developed country (LDC) Members and exceptions for small-scale, artisanal, or subsistence fishing.
  • The 'situational' approach is a hybrid model that prohibits capital and operating cost subsidies only when enterprises target stocks fished above maximum sustainable levels or at effort levels that decline biomass below maximum sustainable yield.
  • A capping approach proposed by Argentina, Australia, the United States, and Uruguay would categorize Members into three tiers based on 2015–2017 marine capture production. Tier 1 (0.7% or more of global production) and Tier 2 (more than 0.05% but less than 0.7%) would face subsidy caps, while Tier 3 (less than 0.05%) would not be required to schedule a cap.
  • China's capping proposal suggests three possible variables for fixing subsidy levels: a proportion of subsidies from a base period, a percentage of average landed value of wild marine capture, or a percentage of global average subsidy per fisher multiplied by the Member's number of fishers.
  • A 'de minimis' approach would establish an overall prohibition of subsidies with minimal permitted levels calculated as a percentage of a Member's total landed value of marine fisheries catch, allowing LDCs and developing members longer phase-down periods.
  • Proposals for prohibiting subsidies to fishing in areas beyond national jurisdiction include one that targets any subsidy tied to activities in high seas or foreign Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and another that targets vessels operating under a flag other than that of the subsidizing Member or an access agreement partner.
  • India has proposed that subsidies provided by developing Members for fishing within territorial waters, EEZs, and the high seas should be exempted, regardless of the overall approach chosen for the overcapacity and overfishing disciplines.
  • Proposed 'Green Box' lists of allowable subsidies generally exclude expenditures for fisheries management and enforcement, with some proposals extending this to natural disaster recovery, crew safety, and technology that reduces environmental impact.

Cite the original document

APA
Tipping, A. (2020). Addressing the Development Dimension of an Overcapacity and Overfishing Subsidy Discipline in the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/overfishing-discipline-wto-fisheries-subsidies.pdf
Chicago
Tipping, Alice. Addressing the Development Dimension of an Overcapacity and Overfishing Subsidy Discipline in the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2020. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/overfishing-discipline-wto-fisheries-subsidies.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Tipping |first1=Alice |title=Addressing the Development Dimension of an Overcapacity and Overfishing Subsidy Discipline in the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |date=January 2020 |url=https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/overfishing-discipline-wto-fisheries-subsidies.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{tipping2020addressing, author = {Tipping, Alice}, title = {{Addressing the Development Dimension of an Overcapacity and Overfishing Subsidy Discipline in the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, year = {2020}, month = jan, url = {https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/overfishing-discipline-wto-fisheries-subsidies.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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