Addressing the Development Dimension of an Overcapacity and Overfishing Subsidy Discipline in the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations

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The document analyzes several proposed WTO disciplines for overcapacity and overfishing subsidies, including list-based, effects-based, hybrid, and capping approaches. It evaluates how these mechanisms interact with special and differential treatment (S&D) for developing nations, emphasizing that long-term development and food security depend on the sustainable exploitation of fish stocks. The author suggests combining different approaches—such as situational prohibitions with quantitative caps—to better align environmental imperatives with poverty reduction and industrial development goals.

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  • List-based approaches prohibit specific types of subsidies, such as those targeting capital and operating costs of vessels, but implicitly allow any subsidies not included on the list, such as income support for fishers.
  • A 'situational' hybrid approach would prohibit capital and operating cost subsidies only when enterprises target stocks fished above maximum sustainable levels or with effort that declines biomass below maximum sustainable yield.
  • The capping proposal by Argentina, Australia, the United States, and Uruguay divides members into three tiers based on 2015–2017 marine capture production, with Tier 1 members (0.7% or more of global production) required to negotiate individual subsidy caps or accept a default cap of $50 million annually.
  • China's capping approach offers three variable options for fixing subsidy levels: a proportion of subsidies from a base period, a percentage of average landed value of wild marine capture, or a percentage of global per capita subsidies multiplied by the member's number of fishers.
  • A 'de minimis' approach would require members to phase down subsidies to a minimal level calculated as a percentage of total landed value, while providing developing and LDC members with higher allowable levels and longer transition periods.
  • Proposals for distant water fishing prohibitions target subsidies for activities in the high seas or foreign Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), with some versions specifically targeting vessels operating under flags other than the subsidizing member's.
  • India has proposed that subsidies provided by developing members for fishing within territorial waters, EEZs, and the high seas should be entirely exempted from overcapacity and overfishing disciplines.
  • The document argues that the interrelationship between environmental sustainability and development is dynamic, as subsidies that deplete fish stocks eventually undermine poverty reduction and food security.
  • To prevent the circumvention of disciplines, 'green box' lists of allowable subsidies (such as those for fisheries management or disaster recovery) should be narrowly drafted or subject to safeguard clauses.

Cite the original document

APA
Tipping, A. (2020). Addressing the Development Dimension of an Overcapacity and Overfishing Subsidy Discipline in the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/overfishing-discipline-wto-fisheries-subsidies.pdf
Chicago
Tipping, Alice. Addressing the Development Dimension of an Overcapacity and Overfishing Subsidy Discipline in the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2020. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/overfishing-discipline-wto-fisheries-subsidies.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Tipping |first1=Alice |title=Addressing the Development Dimension of an Overcapacity and Overfishing Subsidy Discipline in the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |date=January 2020 |url=https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/overfishing-discipline-wto-fisheries-subsidies.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{tipping2020addressing, author = {Tipping, Alice}, title = {{Addressing the Development Dimension of an Overcapacity and Overfishing Subsidy Discipline in the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, year = {2020}, month = jan, url = {https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/overfishing-discipline-wto-fisheries-subsidies.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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