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The report recommends that India integrate a stability mechanism comprising consignment auctions, vintage-based credit classification, and price corridors into its CCTS to avoid the prolonged low prices and investment inertia seen in other global emissions trading systems.

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  • India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) is at risk of supply-demand imbalances and subdued price signals due to its baseline-and-credit architecture, which allows for surplus credit accumulation through moderate initial benchmarks and unlimited banking.
  • Global evidence from the EU ETS, Alberta's TIER, and Australia's Safeguard Mechanism shows that delaying the implementation of stability mechanisms leads to prolonged periods of low prices, structural oversupply, and costly, politically contentious retrospective reforms.
  • The report proposes a tailored PSAM for the CCTS consisting of three integrated elements: a consignment auction system for rule-based credit interventions, a vintage-based credit classification to limit the impact of older surplus credits, and a price corridor to guide interventions when prices deviate from expected levels.
  • A consignment auction system is recommended to bridge the implementation gap in the CCTS, as credits are only issued after verification; this system would allow firms to consign earned credits to a government-run platform for price discovery and supply management.
  • Implementing a vintage-based credit classification system would act as a 'soft cap' on banking by limiting compliance eligibility to recent vintages, preventing long-dated surpluses from suppressing future price signals.
  • The CCTS's lack of temporal restrictions on banking means obligated entities can indefinitely carry forward surplus Carbon Credit Certificates (CCCs), which may lead to price suppression and delay the adoption of capital-intensive abatement technologies.
  • Lessons from India's Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme indicate that conservative benchmarks and a lack of liquidity support can lead to modest trading volumes and prices anchored to administrative floors.
  • The report suggests that as the CCTS matures, India should consider transitioning from purely benchmark-based allocation to auctioning to increase price transparency and generate fiscal revenues for clean technology investment.

Cite the original document

APA
Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (n.d.). Strengthening India’s carbon market. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/Strengthening%20India%E2%80%99s%20carbon%20market.pdf
Chicago
Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. Strengthening India’s carbon market. n.d. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/Strengthening%20India%E2%80%99s%20carbon%20market.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis |title=Strengthening India’s carbon market |url=https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/Strengthening%20India%E2%80%99s%20carbon%20market.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ieefa-001961)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{instituteforenergyeconomicsandfinancialanalysisndstrengthening, author = {{Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}}, title = {{Strengthening India’s carbon market}}, institution = {Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}, url = {https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/Strengthening%20India%E2%80%99s%20carbon%20market.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ieefa-001961} }

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