Queensland Competition Authority Should Exit Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal Pricing Regulation

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This briefing argues that the QCA's regulation of the Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal is an inefficient use of taxpayer money and that the terminal's A$850 million rehabilitation provision is excessively high compared to industry peers.

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  • The rehabilitation provision for the Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal (DBCT) increased by 96% from A$433 million in 2017 to A$850 million in a recent determination, despite the QCA ruling that the operator's original proposal of A$1.22 billion was excessive.
  • There is a perverse financial incentive for Dalrymple Bay Infrastructure (DBI) to increase rehabilitation provisions because it earns a guaranteed return on its total regulated capital base.
  • The A$850 million provision for DBCT is described as absurd when compared to Port Waratah Coal Services (PWCS), which operates the world's largest coal loading facility and carries a rehabilitation provision of only A$101 million.
  • The author suggests the QCA should move away from detailed pricing regulation and instead set maximum prices or publish average monthly revenue per tonne as a price proxy, using an arbitration system for disputes.
  • The 2019 pricing round preliminary ruling by the QCA spent only two pages on the site restoration provision, despite it representing 20-25% of DBI's regulated asset base.

Cite the original document

APA
Evans, O. (2021). Queensland Competition Authority Should Exit Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal Pricing Regulation. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Queensland-Competition-Authority-Should-Exit-Dalrymple-Bay-Coal-Terminal-Pricing-Regulation_May-2021.pdf
Chicago
Evans, Owen. Queensland Competition Authority Should Exit Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal Pricing Regulation. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 2021. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Queensland-Competition-Authority-Should-Exit-Dalrymple-Bay-Coal-Terminal-Pricing-Regulation_May-2021.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Evans |first1=Owen |title=Queensland Competition Authority Should Exit Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal Pricing Regulation |publisher=Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis |date=May 2021 |url=https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Queensland-Competition-Authority-Should-Exit-Dalrymple-Bay-Coal-Terminal-Pricing-Regulation_May-2021.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ieefa-001859)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{evans2021queensland, author = {Evans, Owen}, title = {{Queensland Competition Authority Should Exit Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal Pricing Regulation}}, institution = {Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}, year = {2021}, month = may, url = {https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Queensland-Competition-Authority-Should-Exit-Dalrymple-Bay-Coal-Terminal-Pricing-Regulation_May-2021.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ieefa-001859} }

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