Construction of the North East Gas Interconnector (NEGI)

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The report finds that the North East Gas Interconnector (NEGI) is likely to fail because it is an uneconomic project based on overly optimistic demand forecasts and a global LNG glut, effectively serving as a monopoly for foreign owners.

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  • The North East Gas Interconnector (NEGI) project has experienced a 25% capacity downgrade, reducing its pipe size from 14 to 12 inches and estimated capital costs from A$800 million to A$650 million, due to a lack of customer interest.
  • The project is structured as an unregulated natural monopoly, meaning the operator, Jemena, can charge non-commercial tariffs, with the economic benefits primarily accruing to foreign owners (the governments of China and Singapore).
  • The global LNG market is in a state of oversupply, with liquefaction capacity of 308Mt in 2015 exceeding demand of 245Mt by 26%, and capacity is expected to grow by 30% to 400Mtpa by 2020.
  • Demand for LNG in key North Asian markets is declining. Japan's imports are forecast to fall to 62mtpa by 2030, a 28% decline from 2014 levels, driven by nuclear restarts, energy efficiency and the rise of solar power.
  • China's demand for LNG is being displaced by cheaper piped gas from Russia via the 'Power of Siberia' pipelines, which are equivalent to 50Mtpa of gas, and by a rapid increase in domestic renewable energy capacity.
  • Australian East Coast onshore gas fields are globally high-cost producers. Most are currently loss-making before shipping and liquefaction costs are even considered, as their production costs (US$4.18-4.56/GJ) exceed current Japanese contract prices (approx. US$5.03/GJ) when transport costs are added.
  • Unconventional gas in the Northern Territory is entirely uneconomic at current prices, with break-even costs estimated at US$7 at the wellhead, which would result in delivered costs to the east coast market of A$12-13+ per GJ.
  • The project is essentially underwritten by the Northern Territory government through the Power and Water Commission (PWC), which is attempting to use the pipeline to dispose of excess gas it contracted for based on overestimated demand.

Cite the original document

APA
Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (n.d.). Construction of the North East Gas Interconnector (NEGI). https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Pipe-Dream-A-Financial-Analysis-of-the-NEGI-MAY-2016.pdf
Chicago
Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. Construction of the North East Gas Interconnector (NEGI). n.d. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Pipe-Dream-A-Financial-Analysis-of-the-NEGI-MAY-2016.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis |title=Construction of the North East Gas Interconnector (NEGI) |url=https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Pipe-Dream-A-Financial-Analysis-of-the-NEGI-MAY-2016.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ieefa-001802)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{instituteforenergyeconomicsandfinancialanalysisndconstruction, author = {{Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}}, title = {{Construction of the North East Gas Interconnector (NEGI)}}, institution = {Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}, url = {https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Pipe-Dream-A-Financial-Analysis-of-the-NEGI-MAY-2016.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ieefa-001802} }

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