Domestic Gas Reservation Scheme: exposure drafts

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IEEFA recommends that the Australian government limit Ministerial discretion and avoid artificial oversupply in the domestic gas reservation scheme to prevent undermining long-term investment incentives.

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  • Artificial oversupply of the domestic gas market, specifically the option for the Minister to set target aggregate supply above forecast demand (between 0-10%), may undermine investment incentives and create uncertainty regarding future supply and prices.
  • To maintain gas availability without the downsides of artificial oversupply, the government should align domestic supply with demand plus available storage capacity, including facilities controlled by exporters like Roma or Moomba.
  • Exporters should be permitted to "bank" supply volumes provided above their domestic supply obligations (DSOs) to offset future obligations, even in the absence of existing supply debt.
  • Identifying "additional gas" is difficult because it is hard to determine if new supplies would have been developed without exporter contracts; IEEFA suggests limiting exporter purchases to smaller producers to ensure genuine additionality.
  • High levels of Ministerial discretion regarding adjustment quantities and target aggregate supply create market uncertainty, particularly concerning the potential extension of Gladstone LNG’s Kogas LNG sale and purchase agreement expiring in 2031.
  • Export licences should be limited to a maximum of 10 years to reduce sovereign risk perceptions, allow for more frequent market assessments, and align with the timing of LNG sale and purchase agreements.
  • While applying the reservation policy to Western Australia is welcomed to avoid shortfalls, there is a need for greater transparency regarding wholesale gas prices under long-term contracts in that state to better inform DSO determinations.

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APA
Runciman, J. (2026). Domestic Gas Reservation Scheme: exposure drafts. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2026-09/IEEFA%20submission_Domestic%20Gas%20Reservation%20Scheme%20exposure%20drafts_Sept2026.pdf
Chicago
Runciman, Josh. Domestic Gas Reservation Scheme: exposure drafts. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 2026. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2026-09/IEEFA%20submission_Domestic%20Gas%20Reservation%20Scheme%20exposure%20drafts_Sept2026.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite press release |last1=Runciman |first1=Josh |title=Domestic Gas Reservation Scheme: exposure drafts |publisher=Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis |date=24 September 2026 |url=https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2026-09/IEEFA%20submission_Domestic%20Gas%20Reservation%20Scheme%20exposure%20drafts_Sept2026.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ieefa-001463)}}
BibTeX
@misc{runciman2026domestic, author = {Runciman, Josh}, title = {{Domestic Gas Reservation Scheme: exposure drafts}}, publisher = {Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}, year = {2026}, month = sep, url = {https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2026-09/IEEFA%20submission_Domestic%20Gas%20Reservation%20Scheme%20exposure%20drafts_Sept2026.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ieefa-001463} }

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