Finessing India’s Power Market Design to be More Competitive

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This research paper argues that adopting MBED and FCAS mechanisms in India will reduce power procurement costs for distribution companies and create new revenue streams for flexibility assets like batteries to support a low-emission energy transition.

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  • The proposed Market Based Economic Dispatch (MBED) mechanism, scheduled to begin in April 2022, aims to optimize power generation resources and reduce annual power procurement costs by Rs12,000 crore (US$1.6bn).
  • MBED is expected to benefit renewable energy assets by improving the bankability of power purchase agreements (PPAs), reducing payment delays, and potentially lowering the cost of capital.
  • The current state-level decentralized procurement model in India is inefficient, as distribution companies (discoms) often self-schedule in a way that violates merit dispatch orders and limits the deployment of variable renewable energy (VRE).
  • The Indian Energy Exchange (IEX) has proposed 'gross bidding' as an alternative to MBED, which would allow discoms to place both buy and sell bids for contracted capacity in the day-ahead market to increase liquidity and price discovery.
  • CERC's draft regulations for Frequency Control Ancillary Services (FCAS) recognize energy storage and demand response as dispatchable resources to maintain grid frequency near 50Hz, though the draft currently excludes battery storage and demand response from Primary Reserve Ancillary Service (PRAS).
  • Utility-scale batteries are identified as the fastest response tools for frequency control, with response times of less than one second, and can potentially replace traditional generating capacity at a ratio where 1MW of battery capacity replaces almost 2.3MW of traditional capacity.
  • A formal FCAS market would provide a new revenue stream for utility-scale batteries and pumped hydro storage (PHS), moving beyond reliance on price arbitrage for profitability.

Cite the original document

APA
Shah, K. (2021). Finessing India’s Power Market Design to be More Competitive. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Finessing-Indias-Power-Market-Design-to-be-More-Competitive_September-2021.pdf
Chicago
Shah, Kashish. Finessing India’s Power Market Design to be More Competitive. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 2021. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Finessing-Indias-Power-Market-Design-to-be-More-Competitive_September-2021.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Shah |first1=Kashish |title=Finessing India’s Power Market Design to be More Competitive |publisher=Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis |date=September 2021 |url=https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Finessing-Indias-Power-Market-Design-to-be-More-Competitive_September-2021.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ieefa-001236)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{shah2021finessing, author = {Shah, Kashish}, title = {{Finessing India’s Power Market Design to be More Competitive}}, institution = {Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}, year = {2021}, month = sep, url = {https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Finessing-Indias-Power-Market-Design-to-be-More-Competitive_September-2021.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ieefa-001236} }

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