Exelon’s Proposed Acquisition of Pepco: Corporate Strategy at Ratepayer Expense

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This testimony argues that Exelon's acquisition of Pepco would harm D.C. ratepayers by prioritizing the profitability of Exelon's nuclear fleet over D.C.'s renewable energy goals and rate stability.

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  • Exelon's status as the largest owner of nuclear power plants in the country creates a fiduciary duty to maximize power prices, which conflicts with the interests of Washington, D.C. electric customers.
  • Exelon has a history of lobbying against community renewable energy and the expansion of renewable energy standards in Maryland after acquiring Constellation, suggesting it will not support D.C.'s solar and renewable energy goals.
  • The merger is viewed as a strategy for Exelon to secure stable revenues from regulated distribution utilities to offset the volatile earnings of its aging nuclear and coal plants, which may lead to higher rates for customers.
  • Exelon is proposing to pay $2.5 billion more than the actual value of Pepco's assets, increasing the pressure on the company to extract value through rate increases for customers.
  • Since acquiring Baltimore Gas & Electric in 2012, BG&E customers have experienced four rate increases, serving as a precedent for potential outcomes of the Pepco merger.

Cite the original document

APA
Kunkel, C. (2015). Exelon’s Proposed Acquisition of Pepco: Corporate Strategy at Ratepayer Expense. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. https://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Exelon-DC-hearing.pdf
Chicago
Kunkel, Cathy. Exelon’s Proposed Acquisition of Pepco: Corporate Strategy at Ratepayer Expense. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 2015. https://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Exelon-DC-hearing.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite press release |last1=Kunkel |first1=Cathy |title=Exelon’s Proposed Acquisition of Pepco: Corporate Strategy at Ratepayer Expense |publisher=Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis |date=23 January 2015 |url=https://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Exelon-DC-hearing.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ieefa-001178)}}
BibTeX
@misc{kunkel2015exelons, author = {Kunkel, Cathy}, title = {{Exelon’s Proposed Acquisition of Pepco: Corporate Strategy at Ratepayer Expense}}, publisher = {Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}, year = {2015}, month = jan, url = {https://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Exelon-DC-hearing.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ieefa-001178} }

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