Buying Power From AMP’s Prairie State and Combined Hydro Project Has Been a Financial Disaster for Cleveland Public Power and Its Ratepayers

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The report finds that Cleveland Public Power paid at least $106 million more for electricity from the Prairie State and Combined Hydro projects between 2012 and 2019 than it would have paid in the wholesale PJM markets.

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  • Between 2012 and 2019, Cleveland Public Power (CPP) paid at least $106 million more for power from the Prairie State and Combined Hydro projects than the cost of purchasing equivalent capacity and energy in the wholesale PJM markets.
  • The average cost for power from the Prairie State Energy Campus charged to Cleveland between 2012 and 2019 was $67.50 per MWh, which is 40% higher than AMP's original claims and 90% higher than PJM market costs.
  • Since 2016, Cleveland Public Power has paid an average of $178.60 per MWh for power from the Combined Hydro Project, representing a 167% increase over AMP's projected cost and a 269% increase over PJM market costs.
  • Construction costs for both projects significantly exceeded estimates: the Prairie State plant cost increased by $1 billion (approximately 20%) over the $4 billion estimate, and the Combined Hydro Project cost rose from an estimated $4,360 per kW in 2007 to over $10,800 per kW.
  • The projects failed to meet projected power production levels; for example, Prairie State produced an average of 9.6 million MWh annually between 2012 and 2019, compared to the estimated 11.8 million MWh.
  • Significant delays occurred during construction: Prairie State was delayed by six to 12 months, while the Combined Hydro Project units (Cannelton, Willow Island, and Smithland) were delayed by two to three years or longer.

Cite the original document

APA
Schlissel, D. (2020). Buying Power From AMP’s Prairie State and Combined Hydro Project Has Been a Financial Disaster for Cleveland Public Power and Its Ratepayers. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Buying-Power-From-AMP_Financial-Disaster-for-CPP-and-Ratepayers_September-2020.pdf
Chicago
Schlissel, David. Buying Power From AMP’s Prairie State and Combined Hydro Project Has Been a Financial Disaster for Cleveland Public Power and Its Ratepayers. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 2020. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Buying-Power-From-AMP_Financial-Disaster-for-CPP-and-Ratepayers_September-2020.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Schlissel |first1=David |title=Buying Power From AMP’s Prairie State and Combined Hydro Project Has Been a Financial Disaster for Cleveland Public Power and Its Ratepayers |publisher=Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis |date=September 2020 |url=https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Buying-Power-From-AMP_Financial-Disaster-for-CPP-and-Ratepayers_September-2020.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ieefa-001052)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{schlissel2020buying, author = {Schlissel, David}, title = {{Buying Power From AMP’s Prairie State and Combined Hydro Project Has Been a Financial Disaster for Cleveland Public Power and Its Ratepayers}}, institution = {Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}, year = {2020}, month = sep, url = {https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Buying-Power-From-AMP_Financial-Disaster-for-CPP-and-Ratepayers_September-2020.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ieefa-001052} }

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