IEEFA Europe: Can Power Market Reforms Curb UK Ratepayer Handouts to Gas, Coal and Nuclear?

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This IEEFA statement argues that the U.K. capacity market provides unnecessary subsidies to conventional power plants, noting that T4 auctions have allocated approximately £1 billion annually from ratepayers for plants that were already planning to remain available.

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  • The U.K.'s four-year-ahead (T4) capacity auctions have allocated approximately £1 billion per year, totaling £2.97 billion, to power plants to ensure availability, despite most plants already intending to remain operational.
  • The capacity market's goal of integrating variable renewables is contradicted by the fact that 80% of funds go to existing capacity, with nearly one third allocated to coal and nuclear plants.
  • The author suggests that the need for a capacity market could be mitigated through targeted investments in electricity interconnection with Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, and Norway, as well as investments in batteries and digital metering to smooth demand peaks.
  • The balancing market could potentially replace the capacity market if reforms are implemented, such as allowing renewables to participate and reducing scheduling periods from 30 minutes to 15 or 5 minutes.
  • Two reforms scheduled for November 2018 aim to make the balancing market more effective: doubling the value of loss load (VoLL) from £3,000 to £6,000 per MWh and reducing the Price Average Reference (PAR) volume from 50MWh to 1MWh.

Cite the original document

APA
Wynn, G. (2017). IEEFA Europe: Can Power Market Reforms Curb UK Ratepayer Handouts to Gas, Coal and Nuclear? Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. https://ieefa.org/resources/ieefa-europe-can-power-market-reforms-curb-uk-ratepayer-handouts-gas-coal-and-nuclear
Chicago
Wynn, Gerard. IEEFA Europe: Can Power Market Reforms Curb UK Ratepayer Handouts to Gas, Coal and Nuclear? Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 2017. https://ieefa.org/resources/ieefa-europe-can-power-market-reforms-curb-uk-ratepayer-handouts-gas-coal-and-nuclear.
Wikipedia
{{cite press release |last1=Wynn |first1=Gerard |title=IEEFA Europe: Can Power Market Reforms Curb UK Ratepayer Handouts to Gas, Coal and Nuclear? |publisher=Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis |date=30 January 2017 |url=https://ieefa.org/resources/ieefa-europe-can-power-market-reforms-curb-uk-ratepayer-handouts-gas-coal-and-nuclear |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ieefa-000693)}}
BibTeX
@misc{wynn2017ieefa, author = {Wynn, Gerard}, title = {{IEEFA Europe: Can Power Market Reforms Curb UK Ratepayer Handouts to Gas, Coal and Nuclear?}}, publisher = {Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis}, year = {2017}, month = jan, url = {https://ieefa.org/resources/ieefa-europe-can-power-market-reforms-curb-uk-ratepayer-handouts-gas-coal-and-nuclear}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ieefa-000693} }

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