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This report provides a strategic roadmap for negotiators of the global plastics treaty, arguing that relying on exclusive consensus and optional annexes will lead to a weak agreement. It concludes that voting and 'opt-out' mechanisms for technical updates are essential to prevent the treaty from becoming obsolete or paralyzed by a few dissenting nations.

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  • A majority of countries support several key elements for an effective treaty: a full life-cycle approach (100 countries), binding targets to reduce global primary plastic polymer production to sustainable levels (100+ countries), a binding phase-out of the most harmful plastic products and chemicals (100+ countries), and a financial mechanism with a dedicated fund and secretariat (151 countries).
  • The report warns against the 'lowest common denominator' approach, noting that some countries, such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, have indicated they will not sign any treaty with effective rules, and that the current US administration is unlikely to join even a weak agreement.
  • Using optional annexes can significantly delay a treaty's entry into force; for example, under MARPOL, the ability to opt out of certain annexes contributed to delays in enforcement ranging from 15 to 30 years for Annexes III, IV, and V.
  • Implicit acceptance (an 'opt-out' system) for annex amendments is the most effective design for maintaining technical relevance, as seen in MARPOL, where updates are adopted automatically unless a party explicitly rejects them.
  • The 'opt-in' approach for annex amendments used in the Minamata Convention on Mercury has proven ineffective; only 13% of parties (20 of 152) used the option to make amendments inapplicable unless they explicitly joined, and none of those 20 parties have actually opted into the amendments from COP-4 or COP-5.
  • Exclusive reliance on consensus in decision-making can lead to institutional paralysis, as evidenced by the UNFCCC, where the lack of voting procedures has allowed a small number of objections to delay or simplify critical decisions.
  • The report highlights that the participation of civil society is a critical driver of success in international treaties, citing the Ottawa Process for the landmine ban and the Ramsar Convention as examples where NGOs and scientists provided essential expertise and political momentum.

Cite the original document

APA
Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (2025). Perjanjian Plastik yang Berkesan. https://www.no-burn.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/BM-INC-5.2-Pathways-Report-1.pdf
Chicago
Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives. Perjanjian Plastik yang Berkesan. 2025. https://www.no-burn.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/BM-INC-5.2-Pathways-Report-1.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives |title=Perjanjian Plastik yang Berkesan |date=June 2025 |url=https://www.no-burn.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/BM-INC-5.2-Pathways-Report-1.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document gaia-000256)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{globalallianceforincineratoralternatives2025perjanjian, author = {{Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives}}, title = {{Perjanjian Plastik yang Berkesan}}, institution = {Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives}, year = {2025}, month = jun, url = {https://www.no-burn.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/BM-INC-5.2-Pathways-Report-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document gaia-000256} }

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