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The document argues that replacing high-cost equity with lower-cost corporate debt or securitized bonds can reduce consumer rate increases associated with the early retirement of fossil fuel plants. It examines the trade-offs between shareholder returns and consumer costs, suggesting that refinancing 'regulatory assets' can mitigate stranded asset risks and accelerate the transition to clean energy resources like wind and solar.

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  • The declining cost of renewable energy has made operating coal generation more expensive than replacing it with wind and solar in many U.S. regions, leading to a reconsideration of the prudency of continuing coal operations for regulated utilities.
  • Early retirement of fossil plants often creates a conflict where consumer savings from avoided fuel and operating costs are offset by higher rates caused by accelerated depreciation schedules used to recover remaining investment balances.
  • Utilities can lower the cost of carrying unrecovered plant investments by replacing the equity portion of 'regulatory assets' with lower-cost corporate debt or, where state legislation permits, even lower-cost securitized 'rate-payer backed' bonds.
  • Refinancing outstanding investment balances after early retirement can reduce several risks for investors, including technological risks from cleaner competitors, regulatory risks from stranded assets, and commodity risks from fluctuating fossil fuel prices.
  • There is an argument that shareholders, rather than consumers, should bear the financial burden of early retirements because equity risk premiums already compensate them for such risks and allowing full recovery creates a moral hazard for management.
  • While increasing debt leverage to replace equity may concern investors regarding earnings opportunities or bankruptcy risk, such changes should be evaluated within the broader financial context and compared to similar utilities.

Cite the original document

APA
LEHR, R., & O’BOYLE, M. (2018). DEBT FOR EQUITY UTILITY REFINANCE. Energy Innovation. https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/Debt-for-Equity-Issue-Brief_12.3.18-2.pdf
Chicago
LEHR, RON, and MIKE O’BOYLE. DEBT FOR EQUITY UTILITY REFINANCE. Energy Innovation, 2018. https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/Debt-for-Equity-Issue-Brief_12.3.18-2.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=LEHR |first1=RON |last2=O’BOYLE |first2=MIKE |title=DEBT FOR EQUITY UTILITY REFINANCE |publisher=Energy Innovation |date=December 2018 |url=https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/Debt-for-Equity-Issue-Brief_12.3.18-2.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{lehr2018debt, author = {LEHR, RON and O’BOYLE, MIKE}, title = {{DEBT FOR EQUITY UTILITY REFINANCE}}, institution = {Energy Innovation}, year = {2018}, month = dec, url = {https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/Debt-for-Equity-Issue-Brief_12.3.18-2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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