Browse all documents

Kickstarting India’s offshore wind market: Lessons from India’s early tenders

Report an error

Summary

AI-generated

This summary is written by a language model reading the source document. It is not the publisher's words and is not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment

This policy brief by Ember analyses the failure of India's early offshore wind auctions and outlines the systemic barriers preventing the sector's growth. It argues that rigid auction designs, a lack of domestic supply chains for high-capacity turbines, and transmission risks have deterred developers, and recommends adopting flexible international best practices to unlock the country's offshore wind potential.

Key insights

AI-generated

These insights are written by a language model reading the source document. They are not the publisher's words and are not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment
  • India's early attempts to launch offshore wind through auctions failed, with two major auctions called off in 2025 due to muted developer interest despite the availability of viability gap funding (VGF), pre-defined offtake contracts, and exclusive seabed rights.
  • The 500 MW offshore wind auction in Gujarat failed because its rigid pricing structure—featuring a fixed tariff of INR 4.50/kWh and a capped subsidy of INR 8.128 crore per MW—did not account for the actual cost of generation. The levelised cost of electricity remained approximately INR 5/kWh higher than the tariff even after the VGF subsidy.
  • A significant barrier to market entry is the absence of a domestic supply chain capable of producing offshore-grade equipment. Current Indian original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) produce turbines in the 2-3 MW range, whereas global offshore standards now average 10+ MW turbines.
  • Project economics in Gujarat were further hampered by a low estimated capacity utilisation factor (CUF) of approximately 36%, which is significantly lower than the international benchmark of 40-50%. In contrast, sites in Tamil Nadu have a higher CUF potential of around 60%, though metocean data for that region is only preliminary.
  • India's approach to transmission risk is insufficient compared to European models. While the Gujarat tender allowed for deadline extensions if the central transmission utility (CTU) delayed grid readiness, it provided no compensation for lost revenue, unlike European TSOs such as TenneT.

Cite the original document

APA
Das, D., & Rodrigues, N. (2025). Kickstarting India’s offshore wind market: Lessons from India’s early tenders. Ember. https://ember-energy.org/app/uploads/2025/11/Policy-Paper_-Kickstarting-Indias-offshore-wind-market.pdf
Chicago
Das, Duttatreya, and Neshwin Rodrigues. Kickstarting India’s offshore wind market: Lessons from India’s early tenders. Ember, 2025. https://ember-energy.org/app/uploads/2025/11/Policy-Paper_-Kickstarting-Indias-offshore-wind-market.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Das |first1=Duttatreya |last2=Rodrigues |first2=Neshwin |title=Kickstarting India’s offshore wind market: Lessons from India’s early tenders |publisher=Ember |date=17 November 2025 |url=https://ember-energy.org/app/uploads/2025/11/Policy-Paper_-Kickstarting-Indias-offshore-wind-market.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{das2025kickstarting, author = {Das, Duttatreya and Rodrigues, Neshwin}, title = {{Kickstarting India’s offshore wind market: Lessons from India’s early tenders}}, institution = {Ember}, year = {2025}, month = nov, url = {https://ember-energy.org/app/uploads/2025/11/Policy-Paper_-Kickstarting-Indias-offshore-wind-market.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

Full text

Collected · Record updated