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The briefing argues that South Africa's proposed nuclear procurement process is unconstitutional and lacks transparency, creating significant risks of corruption and financial instability.

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  • The proposed procurement of up to six nuclear reactors is estimated at a conservative R300 billion, but some economists suggest costs could exceed R1.4 trillion, which is roughly double the country's projected tax revenue for the 2011-2012 financial year.
  • The Department of Energy has failed to provide the public with adequate information, excluding nuclear energy from regulations governing new generation capacity and ignoring PAIA requests from civil society groups like Earthlife Africa and Greenpeace Africa.
  • The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2010 used to justify the procurement is inadequate because it ignores full life cycle costs, including waste management, decommissioning, project financing, insurance, and operational costs.
  • Post-Fukushima safety assessments at Koeberg and Safari-1 have led to recommended improvements that will increase the cost per reactor to build and maintain, yet these costs are not accounted for in the IRP 2010.
  • The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) indicated that the nuclear build would require a 50 percent increase in technical capacity and a proportional budget increase, but Treasury allocations to the NNR have remained stable through 2014.
  • The briefing draws parallels between the current nuclear process and the 1999 Arms Deal, noting that the Arms Deal's actual cost rose from a projected R28-R30 billion to R70 billion due to a lack of transparency and failure to account for all costs.
  • There are allegations that nuclear suppliers, such as the French parastatal Areva, have attempted to manipulate the bidding process through political patronage and strategic alliances to gain a competitive advantage.

Cite the original document

APA
Earthlife Africa (2012). South Africa's Nuclear Procurement Process. https://earthlife.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/SE-Briefing-24_Nuclear-Energy-Procurement_Dec2012.pdf
Chicago
Earthlife Africa. South Africa's Nuclear Procurement Process. 2012. https://earthlife.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/SE-Briefing-24_Nuclear-Energy-Procurement_Dec2012.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Earthlife Africa |title=South Africa's Nuclear Procurement Process |date=December 2012 |url=https://earthlife.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/SE-Briefing-24_Nuclear-Energy-Procurement_Dec2012.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document earthli-000055)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{earthlifeafrica2012south, author = {{Earthlife Africa}}, title = {{South Africa's Nuclear Procurement Process}}, institution = {Earthlife Africa}, year = {2012}, month = dec, url = {https://earthlife.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/SE-Briefing-24_Nuclear-Energy-Procurement_Dec2012.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document earthli-000055} }

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