THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF US GREEN INDUSTRIAL PLANNING

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The document examines the Biden administration's use of the Defense Production Act (DPA) and proposed Congressional legislation to rebuild US industrial planning capacities. It argues that while current actions are often framed around national security or supply chain resilience rather than explicit climate mandates, they create tools—such as public financing and supply chain monitoring—that can be deployed to achieve deep decarbonization. The author recommends establishing robust public financing, enhancing productive capacity monitoring, and implementing formalized sectoral investment targeting.

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  • The Biden administration has utilized the Defense Production Act (DPA) to prioritize the domestic production of clean energy inputs, marking a significant shift toward state intervention for decarbonization and energy resilience. This includes the production of photovoltaic modules, building insulation, heat pumps, electrolyzers, fuel cells, and power grid transformers.
  • The US government's industrial decarbonization strategy focuses on the sector responsible for one-third of national emissions, utilizing tools such as regional clean hydrogen hubs, a "Buy Clean Task Force," and carbon-based trade policies for clean steel and aluminum.
  • There is growing bipartisan interest in Congress to institutionalize industrial planning capacities, specifically through draft bills for semiconductor manufacturing and supply chain resilience. One proposal includes a supply chain oversight body with the power to take equity stakes to steer private investment.
  • A proposal for an "Industrial Finance Corporation" (IFC) suggests a politically viable path toward limited state ownership and public financing. The IFC would potentially leverage $50 billion in capital to provide loans, purchase equity, and acquire assets to support critical industries and advanced technologies.
  • The shift toward industrial policy and "friend-shoring" creates a risk of increased geopolitical tensions, particularly with China, which could undermine collaborative climate diplomacy and lead to a militarized rather than democratically accountable planning apparatus.
  • To achieve deep decarbonization, the document recommends three priority capacity builds: the establishment of robust public financing and asset management (such as a national development bank), improved transparency in supply chain and productive capacity monitoring, and the use of indicative planning for sectoral investment targeting.

Cite the original document

APA
BRUSSELER, M. (2022). THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF US GREEN INDUSTRIAL PLANNING. E3G. https://www.e3g.org/wp-content/uploads/US-Industrial-Planning-Briefing.pdf
Chicago
BRUSSELER, MELANIE. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF US GREEN INDUSTRIAL PLANNING. E3G, 2022. https://www.e3g.org/wp-content/uploads/US-Industrial-Planning-Briefing.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=BRUSSELER |first1=MELANIE |title=THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF US GREEN INDUSTRIAL PLANNING |publisher=E3G |date=July 2022 |url=https://www.e3g.org/wp-content/uploads/US-Industrial-Planning-Briefing.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document e3g-001385)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{brusseler2022political, author = {BRUSSELER, MELANIE}, title = {{THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF US GREEN INDUSTRIAL PLANNING}}, institution = {E3G}, year = {2022}, month = jul, url = {https://www.e3g.org/wp-content/uploads/US-Industrial-Planning-Briefing.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document e3g-001385} }

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