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The report details a workshop focused on the evolving biothreat, the convergence of biotechnology with AI and robotics, and the need for a multi-layered U.S. biodefense strategy. It emphasizes the importance of U.S. technical leadership, the development of rapid medical countermeasures, and the establishment of international norms to deter both state and non-state actors.

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  • The biological threat is increasing due to technological advances, the reemergence of strategic competition with nation-state peer competitors, and a perceived decline in U.S. focus on biothreats.
  • State actors may employ bioweapons for military or strategic goals, utilizing stealth and ambiguity to elicit an uncertain response, whereas terrorists typically aim for mass casualties using airborne agents.
  • The convergence of biological sciences with artificial intelligence, robotics, and nanotechnology is creating a revolution in the bio-economy, enabling precise genome manipulation via tools like CRISPR-Cas9.
  • There is a critical need for sustainable U.S. domestic production capacity for medical countermeasures to avoid a "second valley of death" where capabilities are lost to business dynamics or foreign acquisition.
  • The U.S. should leverage its scientific leadership to rebuild international norms against the development and use of weapons of mass destruction, potentially using models like the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
  • The workshop organizers recommend a "moonshot" initiative to expand the biodefense community to include academia and industry at a larger scale and to develop a more effective national and international communication strategy.

Cite the original document

APA
Singh, A., Parthemore, C., & Weber, A. (n.d.). MAKING BIOWEAPONS OBSOLETE. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Making_Bioweapons_Obsolete.pdf
Chicago
Singh, Anup, Christine Parthemore, and Andrew Weber. MAKING BIOWEAPONS OBSOLETE. The Council on Strategic Risks, n.d. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Making_Bioweapons_Obsolete.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Singh |first1=Anup |last2=Parthemore |first2=Christine |last3=Weber |first3=Andrew |title=MAKING BIOWEAPONS OBSOLETE |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Making_Bioweapons_Obsolete.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{singhndmaking, author = {Singh, Anup and Parthemore, Christine and Weber, Andrew}, title = {{MAKING BIOWEAPONS OBSOLETE}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Making_Bioweapons_Obsolete.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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