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The report argues that while COVID-19 accelerated the deployment of biosurveillance tools, current systems remain too focused on specific known threats and lack the integration needed for true early warning. It details the structural and technical requirements for an ideal system—including metagenomic sequencing and AI-driven digital surveillance—and evaluates progress in the U.S. and various global regions. The authors recommend a shift toward pathogen-agnostic tools, increased funding for biodefense, and the establishment of regional hubs and international mechanisms to coordinate global responses to natural, accidental, or deliberate biological events.

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  • Effective pathogen early warning requires a combination of structural components, such as sustained government investment and workforce pipelines, and technical components, including biological sample analysis and computational data integration.
  • Current biosurveillance is often limited by a focus on pre-identified threats; the report advocates for 'pathogen-agnostic' tools, such as metagenomic sequencing, which can detect unknown or engineered pathogens without needing a predefined target list.
  • Metagenomic sequencing is identified as a critical technical capability for unbiased detection of unknown pathogens, though its implementation is currently limited by the need for advanced bioinformatics and software.
  • The CDC's Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics (CFA), launched in April 2022, aims to act as a 'national weather service' for infectious diseases by integrating data for disease modeling and forecasting.
  • U.S. biodefense funding has seen significant declines over the last decade; for example, the Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) budget dropped from nearly $2 billion in 2010 to $1.3 billion in the FY23 request.
  • The report recommends that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) pilot pathogen-agnostic early-warning systems at strategic military bases, such as those in Hawaii or the Washington, D.C. region, to serve as test beds.
  • In Central Asia and the Caucasus, Georgia and Kazakhstan are highlighted as regional leaders in biosurveillance, leveraging historical post-Soviet cooperation and U.S. BTRP funding to build high-containment lab capacities.
  • The Biosurveillance Network of the Silk Road is proposed as a potential regional hub for early warning in Central Asia and the Caucasus due to its existing cross-border data exchange platforms.
  • Africa's early warning efforts are advancing through initiatives like the Africa Pathogen Genomics Initiative and the LabPlus Africa project, which uses mobile biosafety labs to reach remote areas.
  • Southeast Asia is a high-risk hotspot for novel pathogens; the report notes that Thailand was the first to sequence COVID-19 outside China using infrastructure built via the BTRP.
  • South Korea is cited as having one of the world's most advanced biosurveillance systems, utilizing a '3T' (testing, tracing, treating) regime and sophisticated event-based and indicator surveillance.
  • The WHO has established the Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence in Berlin to improve global data connectivity and the BioHub in Switzerland to facilitate the secure and equitable sharing of pathogen samples.
  • The report proposes the creation of a new International Biotech Organization (IBTO) as an independent, impartial entity capable of rapidly deploying expert teams to identify pathogen origins regardless of whether the event was natural or deliberate.
  • The authors recommend a 'ten plus ten over ten' investment strategy: $10 billion annually for global health security and $10 billion annually for biodefense, sustained for a decade.

Cite the original document

APA
Dubin, R., Lababidi, R., Moulton, J., Mukundan, H., Parr, L., Parthemore, C., Popescu, S., & Regan, D. P. (2022). Pathogen Early Warning: A Progress Report & Path Forward. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/ImprovePathogenEW-2022.pdf
Chicago
Dubin, Rhys, Rassin Lababidi, John Moulton, Harshini Mukundan, Lillian Parr, Christine Parthemore, Saskia Popescu, and Daniel P. Regan. Pathogen Early Warning: A Progress Report & Path Forward. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2022. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/ImprovePathogenEW-2022.pdf.
Wikipedia
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BibTeX
@techreport{dubin2022pathogen, author = {Dubin, Rhys and Lababidi, Rassin and Moulton, John and Mukundan, Harshini and Parr, Lillian and Parthemore, Christine and Popescu, Saskia and Regan, Daniel P.}, title = {{Pathogen Early Warning: A Progress Report \& Path Forward}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2022}, month = dec, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/ImprovePathogenEW-2022.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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