RUSSIAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECTS UNDER TRACK 2: CASE STUDY OF THE DOMINANT PROJECT TYPE

The document examines the dominance of gas pipeline refurbishment projects within Russia's JI portfolio under Track 2, specifically analyzing whether these projects are 'additional' or would have occurred due to economic incentives. It highlights the role of Gazprom's institutional control over distribution networks and the lack of historical leakage data, which complicates the establishment of accurate emission baselines.

• Gas pipeline refurbishment projects are the most prominent type in the Russian JI project portfolio submitted to the JI Supervisory Committee (JISC) under Track 2, accounting for 53% of the portfolio or 58.7 Mt of projected emission reductions.
• The Stavropol project is the largest individual project in this category, projected to reduce emissions by 25 Mt during the first commitment period, which represents over 40% of the total reductions for this project type.
• There is a significant lack of historical data on methane leakages from low-pressure gas distribution pipelines in Russia, which creates difficulties in establishing accurate baselines for JI projects.
• The additionality of these projects is contested because the value of the saved gas could potentially make repairs profitable without JI incentives, though this depends on who receives the economic benefit of the saved gas.
• The institutional structure of the Russian gas sector supports the case for additionality because distribution companies are paid based on volume and do not benefit financially from saving gas; the only direct economic benefit for them is the sale of Emission Reduction Units (ERUs).
• Gazprom has increased its control over the distribution sector through its holding company Gazpromregiongaz, which as of 2007 had holdings in 197 of approximately 300 regional distribution organizations.
• The authors conclude that while the current institutional setting creates a barrier to updating pipelines without JI, this justification for additionality may not hold beyond 2012 as domestic gas prices rise and economic incentives for conservation strengthen.

APA

Korppoo, A., & Moe, A. (2008). RUSSIAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECTS UNDER TRACK 2: CASE STUDY OF THE DOMINANT PROJECT TYPE. Climate Strategies. https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/gas-paper-final.pdf

Chicago

Korppoo, Anna, and Arild Moe. RUSSIAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECTS UNDER TRACK 2: CASE STUDY OF THE DOMINANT PROJECT TYPE. Climate Strategies, 2008. https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/gas-paper-final.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Korppoo |first1=Anna |last2=Moe |first2=Arild |title=RUSSIAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECTS UNDER TRACK 2: CASE STUDY OF THE DOMINANT PROJECT TYPE |publisher=Climate Strategies |date=March 2008 |url=https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/gas-paper-final.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{korppoo2008russian, author = {Korppoo, Anna and Moe, Arild}, title = {{RUSSIAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECTS UNDER TRACK 2: CASE STUDY OF THE DOMINANT PROJECT TYPE}}, institution = {Climate Strategies}, year = {2008}, month = mar, url = {https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/gas-paper-final.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }