Cinq décisions qui font des ravages
Summary
The analysis argues that Canadian industrial carbon markets are inefficient due to overly generous performance standards, inconsistent application of rules, restrictions on credit use, the exclusion of smaller emitters, and the use of revenues to offset price signals. These factors lead to credit oversupply and price crashes, particularly in Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario, reducing the incentive for industries to decarbonize.
Key insights
- Overly generous performance standards in several provinces have led to an oversupply of credits, causing market prices to drop significantly below the national pricing target of $95 per tonne. In Alberta's TIER system, credits cost approximately $20, and existing credits could meet demand for over two years.
- The application of carbon pricing is inconsistent and lacks transparency, often favoring high-emitting older facilities over greener ones. For example, British Columbia's performance-based system does not use common performance standards for LNG facilities, instead negotiating thresholds on a case-by-case basis.
- Strict limits on the proportion of credits that can be used to meet compliance obligations can paradoxically lower credit prices and reduce the incentive to eliminate emissions. In British Columbia, the proportion of usable credits will be limited to 30% by 2026, creating a bottleneck of excess credits.
- Provinces like Alberta and Ontario are facilitating the exit of voluntary participants from carbon markets, which weakens demand for credits. Voluntary participants represent approximately 31 megatonnes of emissions, or 9% of Canada's total industrial emissions, with a high concentration in Alberta where the mandatory participation threshold is 100 kilotonnes.
- Some provinces are using revenues or credits to mitigate price signals, which weakens the incentive to reduce emissions. Ontario allows emitters to claim back carbon pricing costs for emission reduction investments, while Alberta provides credits proportional to decarbonization investments, which may lead to double-counting of reductions.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Canadian Climate Institute (2025). Cinq décisions qui font des ravages. https://institutclimatique.ca/cinq-decisions-qui-font-des-ravages-tarification-du-carbone-industriel/
- Chicago
- Canadian Climate Institute. Cinq décisions qui font des ravages. 2025. https://institutclimatique.ca/cinq-decisions-qui-font-des-ravages-tarification-du-carbone-industriel/.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |author=Canadian Climate Institute |title=Cinq décisions qui font des ravages |date=3 October 2025 |url=https://institutclimatique.ca/cinq-decisions-qui-font-des-ravages-tarification-du-carbone-industriel/ |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{canadianclimateinstitute2025cinq, author = {{Canadian Climate Institute}}, title = {{Cinq décisions qui font des ravages}}, institution = {Canadian Climate Institute}, year = {2025}, month = oct, url = {https://institutclimatique.ca/cinq-decisions-qui-font-des-ravages-tarification-du-carbone-industriel/}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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