Still Digging: Recommended Investor Response to 2018 Shareholder Resolutions on Rio Tinto’s Climate Lobbying

The report argues that Rio Tinto lacks adequate governance to manage financial and reputational risks from its industry association memberships, which often lobby against climate policies. It criticises the company's failure to provide transparent disclosures on climate-related financial risks and its lack of executive incentives linked to a low-carbon transition. The authors recommend shareholders support resolution 19 to allow advisory resolutions in Australia and resolution 20 to increase transparency regarding climate lobbying.

• Rio Tinto's board is accused of inconsistent corporate governance for denying UK shareholders the opportunity to vote on 2018 resolutions that were put to a vote for Australian shareholders, contradicting a previous commitment to treat all shareholders equally.
• The report recommends voting for resolution 19 to amend the company's constitution to allow advisory shareholder resolutions in Australia, arguing that the board's claims of 'legal uncertainty' are unfounded and contradicted by the company's own history with the 'Aiming for A' resolution.
• Resolution 20 is deemed necessary because Rio Tinto's current disclosures on climate lobbying are 'extremely weak' and the company fails to actively manage misaligned positions held by its industry associations, such as the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) which advocates for taxpayer-funded coal-fired power.
• Rio Tinto is lagging behind its peer BHP Billiton in managing trade association risks; while BHP implemented a policy to align associations with its values, Rio Tinto retains membership in 22 trade associations engaged in climate policy without significant disclosure or efforts to address inconsistencies.
• The company's greenhouse gas intensity KPI is considered insufficient for aligning the business model with a <2°C world because it only covers scope 1 and 2 emissions, which represented approximately 4.7% of total emissions in 2017.
• There is no direct link between Rio Tinto's executive remuneration and its greenhouse gas intensity performance, meaning the remuneration policy fails to incentivise a transition to a commercially resilient low-carbon business model.
• Despite public support for the Paris Agreement, Rio Tinto has engaged in contradictory lobbying, including opposing renewable energy subsidies and targets in Australia and opposing a strengthened carbon tax in British Columbia, Canada.

APA

ClientEarth (2018). Still Digging: Recommended Investor Response to 2018 Shareholder Resolutions on Rio Tinto’s Climate Lobbying. https://www.clientearth.org/media/ms4iawh3/still-digging-recommended-investor-response-to-2018-shareholder-resolutions-on-rio-tintos-climate-lobbying-coll-en.pdf

Chicago

ClientEarth. Still Digging: Recommended Investor Response to 2018 Shareholder Resolutions on Rio Tinto’s Climate Lobbying. 2018. https://www.clientearth.org/media/ms4iawh3/still-digging-recommended-investor-response-to-2018-shareholder-resolutions-on-rio-tintos-climate-lobbying-coll-en.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=ClientEarth |title=Still Digging: Recommended Investor Response to 2018 Shareholder Resolutions on Rio Tinto’s Climate Lobbying |date=April 2018 |url=https://www.clientearth.org/media/ms4iawh3/still-digging-recommended-investor-response-to-2018-shareholder-resolutions-on-rio-tintos-climate-lobbying-coll-en.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{clientearth2018still, author = {{ClientEarth}}, title = {{Still Digging: Recommended Investor Response to 2018 Shareholder Resolutions on Rio Tinto’s Climate Lobbying}}, institution = {ClientEarth}, year = {2018}, month = apr, url = {https://www.clientearth.org/media/ms4iawh3/still-digging-recommended-investor-response-to-2018-shareholder-resolutions-on-rio-tintos-climate-lobbying-coll-en.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }