Observations on reductions from a capacity mechanism levy for energy intensive users in Poland

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ClientEarth argues that the proposed reductions in the capacity mechanism levy for energy-intensive users (EIUs) in Poland would undermine the security of supply objectives of the capacity market by dis-incentivising demand-side response. The organisation highlights that the scheme's costs would be shifted to households and non-EIU consumers, potentially affecting public acceptance. ClientEarth suggests that a fixed annual compensation would be a more adequate form of aid to maintain incentives for shifting consumption away from peak hours. The document also questions the expansion of the beneficiary pool from 52 to 300-350 EIUs and recommends that the Commission reject the scheme to avoid distorting the energy market.

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  • The proposed reductions in the capacity charge for energy-intensive users (EIUs) may contradict the primary goal of the capacity mechanism by removing incentives for these users to shift electricity consumption to off-peak hours.
  • The financial burden of the reductions will be shifted to households and other non-EIU electricity consumers, which may negatively impact public acceptance of the capacity market.
  • Poland expanded the scope of the aid from an original group of 52 EIUs consuming more than 100 GWh/year to an estimated 300-350 EIUs based on sectors in Annex 3 of the Energy and Environmental Aid Guidelines (EEAG), a move ClientEarth argues lacks transparency and justification.
  • A fixed annual compensation amount is proposed as a superior alternative to levy reductions because it would maintain the marginal cost of electricity during peak hours, thereby preserving the incentive for EIUs to reduce peak demand.
  • The proposed reductions target a group of consumers that covers more than 43% of Poland's peak demand, which ClientEarth claims could significantly distort the original concept of the capacity market.

Cite the original document

APA
ClientEarth (2019). Observations on reductions from a capacity mechanism levy for energy intensive users in Poland. https://www.clientearth.org/media/mw1dtvck/observations-on-reductions-from-a-capacity-mechanism-levy-for-energy-intensive-users-in-poland-ce-en.pdf
Chicago
ClientEarth. Observations on reductions from a capacity mechanism levy for energy intensive users in Poland. 2019. https://www.clientearth.org/media/mw1dtvck/observations-on-reductions-from-a-capacity-mechanism-levy-for-energy-intensive-users-in-poland-ce-en.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite press release |author=ClientEarth |title=Observations on reductions from a capacity mechanism levy for energy intensive users in Poland |date=15 July 2019 |url=https://www.clientearth.org/media/mw1dtvck/observations-on-reductions-from-a-capacity-mechanism-levy-for-energy-intensive-users-in-poland-ce-en.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@misc{clientearth2019observations, author = {{ClientEarth}}, title = {{Observations on reductions from a capacity mechanism levy for energy intensive users in Poland}}, publisher = {ClientEarth}, year = {2019}, month = jul, url = {https://www.clientearth.org/media/mw1dtvck/observations-on-reductions-from-a-capacity-mechanism-levy-for-energy-intensive-users-in-poland-ce-en.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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