Transparency of the EU legislative process: trilogues

The document examines the opacity of EU trilogue negotiations, where 89% of legislative files reached agreement in the first reading during the 2014-2019 term. It argues that the current lack of transparency allows privileged industry lobbyists access while excluding civil society and enables Member States to later contradict agreed-upon positions, as seen with the Nature Restoration Law and the Corporate Sustainable Due Diligence Directive. The briefing rejects arguments that transparency would entrench negotiator positions, citing CJEU rulings, and asserts that reactive access requests under Regulation 1049/2001 are insufficient due to systemic delays. It recommends the proactive publication of 'four-column documents', agendas, and calendars, and suggests specific regulatory amendments for the European Parliament, Council, and Commission to formalise this openness.

• Trilogue negotiations have become the dominant method for EU law-making, with 89% of legislative files reaching agreement in the first reading during the 9th parliamentary term (2014-2019), and 875 trilogues held from the start of the current term until December 2023.
• The current opacity of trilogues creates an inequality of access that benefits well-resourced industry lobby groups who obtain unofficial information, while excluding civil society organisations that lack such connections.
• Lack of transparency allows EU Member States to publicly distance themselves from agreements they previously accepted in trilogues, a phenomenon described as the "Blame Brussels" effect.
• Recent examples of Member States attempting to reverse trilogue agreements include Germany's 2023 attempt to backtrack on the 2035 ban for petrol and diesel cars, and efforts by Germany and Italy in February 2024 to undermine the Corporate Sustainable Due Diligence Directive.
• The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has rejected the Council's claim that public disclosure would prevent negotiators from changing their positions, stating that proposals are designed to be discussed and amended.
• Reactive access to documents under Regulation 1049/2001 is ineffective because response times (up to 30 working days) often exceed the speed of the negotiations, rendering the information irrelevant by the time it is received.
• To achieve transparency, the briefing recommends the proactive publication of several document types, most notably the 'four-column document' which lists the positions of the Commission, Parliament, and Council alongside the compromise text.

APA

ClientEarth (2025). Transparency of the EU legislative process: trilogues. https://www.clientearth.org/media/54tnqlkr/clientearth-briefing-on-transparency-in-trilogues.pdf

Chicago

ClientEarth. Transparency of the EU legislative process: trilogues. 2025. https://www.clientearth.org/media/54tnqlkr/clientearth-briefing-on-transparency-in-trilogues.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=ClientEarth |title=Transparency of the EU legislative process: trilogues |date=May 2025 |url=https://www.clientearth.org/media/54tnqlkr/clientearth-briefing-on-transparency-in-trilogues.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{clientearth2025transparency, author = {{ClientEarth}}, title = {{Transparency of the EU legislative process: trilogues}}, institution = {ClientEarth}, year = {2025}, month = may, url = {https://www.clientearth.org/media/54tnqlkr/clientearth-briefing-on-transparency-in-trilogues.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }