2020-08-25-letter-to-dg-competition-legality-of-state-aid-to-german-lignite-operators-ce-en-46cafeb1b29041ee.pdf

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ClientEarth argues that the German coal phase-out law (KVBG) and its implementing contract provide excessive state aid to lignite operators, specifically LEAG and RWE. The organization claims that the lack of a transparent calculation formula masks overcompensation totaling nearly €2 billion. Furthermore, ClientEarth asserts that using these funds to cover the recultivation of opencast mines violates the polluter pays principle, as such costs are already legal obligations of the mine operators under German mining law.

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  • The planned compensations under the KVBG and the implementing contract likely overcompensate lignite plant operators by nearly €2 billion beyond the minimum required to incentivize early closure.
  • Analysis by the Oko-Institut suggests that the €1.75 billion promised to LEAG overcompensates the company by approximately €1 billion, and the €2.6 billion promised to RWE overcompensates it by about €0.9 billion, assuming RWE's mine conversion costs are around €1 billion.
  • The KVBG and the draft contract lack a transparent formula for calculating compensation, which prevents a proper assessment of the proportionality of the aid.
  • The law provides the same compensation regardless of whether plants close on the scheduled date or earlier, which ClientEarth argues fails to properly incentivize the fastest possible reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
  • The draft contract allows compensation funds to be used for the recultivation of opencast mines, which ClientEarth claims violates the polluter pays principle because German mining law already mandates that operators fund such recultivation.
  • The use of plant closure aid for mine recultivation may constitute indirect state aid to mine operators (such as LE-B and its special purpose vehicles) and contradicts the stated purpose of the law, which is the closure of plants rather than mines.

Cite the original document

APA
Kleis, M. (2020). 2020-08-25-letter-to-dg-competition-legality-of-state-aid-to-german-lignite-operators-ce-en-46cafeb1b29041ee.pdf. ClientEarth. https://www.clientearth.org/media/3eohuqoe/2020-08-25-letter-to-dg-competition-legality-of-state-aid-to-german-lignite-operators-ce-en.pdf
Chicago
Kleis, Maria. 2020-08-25-letter-to-dg-competition-legality-of-state-aid-to-german-lignite-operators-ce-en-46cafeb1b29041ee.pdf. ClientEarth, 2020. https://www.clientearth.org/media/3eohuqoe/2020-08-25-letter-to-dg-competition-legality-of-state-aid-to-german-lignite-operators-ce-en.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite press release |last1=Kleis |first1=Maria |title=2020-08-25-letter-to-dg-competition-legality-of-state-aid-to-german-lignite-operators-ce-en-46cafeb1b29041ee.pdf |publisher=ClientEarth |date=25 August 2020 |url=https://www.clientearth.org/media/3eohuqoe/2020-08-25-letter-to-dg-competition-legality-of-state-aid-to-german-lignite-operators-ce-en.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@misc{kleis202020200825lettertodgcompetitionlegalityofstateaidtogermanligniteoperatorsceen46cafeb1b29041eepdf, author = {Kleis, Maria}, title = {{2020-08-25-letter-to-dg-competition-legality-of-state-aid-to-german-lignite-operators-ce-en-46cafeb1b29041ee.pdf}}, publisher = {ClientEarth}, year = {2020}, month = aug, url = {https://www.clientearth.org/media/3eohuqoe/2020-08-25-letter-to-dg-competition-legality-of-state-aid-to-german-lignite-operators-ce-en.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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