The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Environment: An Assessment of Commitments and Trade Agreement Enforcement

The report argues that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) lacks substantive new environmental obligations and relies on enforcement mechanisms that have historically proven ineffective in other U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs). It highlights the absence of a reference to climate change and the elimination of independent oversight bodies, such as a Secretariat. Furthermore, the document identifies Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) as a significant threat, noting its potential to 'chill' environmental regulation and allow corporations to sue governments over public interest laws.

• The TPP's environmental commitments are largely repetitive of existing agreements and, in some cases, weaker than those in previous U.S. FTAs. For instance, it only requires parties to implement the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), omitting six other multilateral environmental agreements previously identified for inclusion.
• The agreement fails to explicitly mention climate change or the objectives of the UNFCCC, despite including vague provisions on transitioning to a low-emission economy. The report suggests the TPP may actually increase emissions by facilitating LNG exports to Japan.
• Party dispute settlement mechanisms for environmental issues are historically underutilized; the report states that no party has ever brought a formal case based on environmental provisions in any U.S. FTA. It cites the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) as an example where illegal logging remains rampant despite the USTR's discretion to enforce the agreement.
• The TPP's public submission process is viewed as ineffective because it does not allow for the creation of a 'factual record,' a feature that has driven the limited successes of similar processes in the NAAEC and CAFTA-DR.
• There is a declining trend in institutional autonomy for environmental oversight in U.S. FTAs. While the NAAEC had a Secretariat with independent authority, the TPP eliminates the Secretariat position entirely, leaving oversight to the USTR and domestic bodies.
• Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions pose a major risk to environmental protection by allowing companies to sue governments for laws that interfere with commercial interests. This can create a 'chilling effect' where states avoid passing environmental laws to prevent legal retaliation.

APA

Center for International Environmental Law (n.d.). The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Environment: An Assessment of Commitments and Trade Agreement Enforcement. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/TPP-Enforcement-Analysis-Nov2015.pdf

Chicago

Center for International Environmental Law. The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Environment: An Assessment of Commitments and Trade Agreement Enforcement. n.d. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/TPP-Enforcement-Analysis-Nov2015.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Center for International Environmental Law |title=The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Environment: An Assessment of Commitments and Trade Agreement Enforcement |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/TPP-Enforcement-Analysis-Nov2015.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{centerforinternationalenvironmentallawndtranspacific, author = {{Center for International Environmental Law}}, title = {{The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Environment: An Assessment of Commitments and Trade Agreement Enforcement}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/TPP-Enforcement-Analysis-Nov2015.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }