Obstructionist Tactics in Decision-Making: Key Elements for Consideration in the Context of a Treaty to End Plastic Pollution

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The document examines how the insistence on consensus-based decision-making in the INC process for a plastic pollution treaty acts as a tool for obstruction, allowing a minority of least ambitious countries to block substantive progress. It contrasts this with other multilateral environmental agreements that include voting provisions to incentivize compromise and avoid deadlock. The brief also details specific procedural tactics used to stall negotiations, such as repeated quorum calls and credential verifications, and warns that without the ability to vote, the final treaty will likely reflect only the lowest common denominator of ambition.

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  • A small number of countries are blocking the final adoption of the INC Rules of Procedure by insisting that voting on substantive matters be deleted, which favors those reluctant to take action to end plastic pollution.
  • The requirement for consensus often functions as a de facto veto for any party, leading to a 'Law of the Least Ambitious Program' where agreements are watered down to the lowest level of ambition all countries can accept.
  • The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is cited as an example where the lack of majority voting, blocked by Saudi Arabia during the first COP, has contributed to the failure to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations.
  • Other multilateral environmental agreements, such as the BBNJ and the Minamata Convention, include voting provisions in their Rules of Procedure, which the document argues leads to compromise without the need to actually resort to voting.
  • Parties may employ various procedural maneuvering tactics to delay decisions, including calling for working groups, requesting secret ballots, and making repeated appeals of the Chair's determinations.

Cite the original document

APA
Sky, M. B. (2024). Obstructionist Tactics in Decision-Making: Key Elements for Consideration in the Context of a Treaty to End Plastic Pollution. Center for International Environmental Law. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Obstructionist-Tactics-in-Decision-Making.pdf
Chicago
Sky, Melissa Blue. Obstructionist Tactics in Decision-Making: Key Elements for Consideration in the Context of a Treaty to End Plastic Pollution. Center for International Environmental Law, 2024. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Obstructionist-Tactics-in-Decision-Making.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Sky |first1=Melissa Blue |title=Obstructionist Tactics in Decision-Making: Key Elements for Consideration in the Context of a Treaty to End Plastic Pollution |publisher=Center for International Environmental Law |date=March 2024 |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Obstructionist-Tactics-in-Decision-Making.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{sky2024obstructionist, author = {Sky, Melissa Blue}, title = {{Obstructionist Tactics in Decision-Making: Key Elements for Consideration in the Context of a Treaty to End Plastic Pollution}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {2024}, month = mar, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Obstructionist-Tactics-in-Decision-Making.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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