Scope and Limits of Decisions by the Conference of the Parties

This policy brief by the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) examines the legal distinctions between decisions made by a Conference of the Parties (COP) and the more formal processes of treaty amendments or new annexes. Using examples from various multilateral environmental agreements, it argues that COPs generally cannot fundamentally alter Party rights or obligations through simple decisions, highlighting the importance of securing strong provisions during initial treaty negotiations, particularly for the future plastics treaty.

• The Conference of the Parties (COP) can typically use decisions for administrative, coordinative, and guidance-based actions, such as adopting implementation guidance, commissioning studies, coordinating with other multilateral environmental agreements, managing budgets, and establishing subsidiary bodies if mandated by the treaty text.
• COPs are generally prohibited from taking decisions that fundamentally change the rights and obligations of Parties. Such changes typically require treaty amendments, which often necessitate a two-thirds or three-fourths majority and a lengthy ratification process by individual Parties before entering into force.
• Adding or removing states or items from a treaty annex, or creating new annexes for procedural or technical issues, generally requires an annex amendment rather than a COP decision. These amendments typically require a two-thirds or three-fourths majority and allow Parties to opt out if they do not wish to be bound.
• Historical examples demonstrate the difficulty of using COP decisions to create binding obligations. In the Basel Convention, a COP decision to ban hazardous waste exports from OECD to non-OECD countries was contested, leading to the adoption of a formal amendment that took 24 years to enter into force. Similarly, the Kyoto Protocol determined that Belarus could not be added to Annex B or assigned an emissions target via decision, requiring a formal amendment instead.
• The ability of a COP to act is further constrained if decisions must be made by explicit consensus or through restrictive voting rules. To avoid obstruction, the brief suggests including specific voting text within the COP mandate in the treaty, citing the BBNJ Agreement as an example.
• The brief concludes that relying on a general framework treaty with the intention of adding detailed obligations later via COP decisions is rarely effective. Because public pressure and negotiation leverage decrease after the initial framework is set, the best opportunity to secure strong, binding provisions is during the initial treaty negotiations.

APA

Sky, M. B. (2024). Scope and Limits of Decisions by the Conference of the Parties. Center for International Environmental Law. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Scope-and-Limits-of-the-Decisions-by-the-Conference-of-the-Parties.pdf

Chicago

Sky, Melissa Blue. Scope and Limits of Decisions by the Conference of the Parties. Center for International Environmental Law, 2024. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Scope-and-Limits-of-the-Decisions-by-the-Conference-of-the-Parties.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Sky |first1=Melissa Blue |title=Scope and Limits of Decisions by the Conference of the Parties |publisher=Center for International Environmental Law |date=October 2024 |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Scope-and-Limits-of-the-Decisions-by-the-Conference-of-the-Parties.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{sky2024scope, author = {Sky, Melissa Blue}, title = {{Scope and Limits of Decisions by the Conference of the Parties}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {2024}, month = oct, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Scope-and-Limits-of-the-Decisions-by-the-Conference-of-the-Parties.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }