Promoting the Effectiveness of the Rotterdam Convention: Ways Forward and Procedural Implications

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The report examines the difficulties in listing hazardous substances under Annex III of the Rotterdam Convention due to the requirement for consensus, which has blocked chemicals like chrysotile asbestos, Paraquat, and Fenthion despite scientific evidence. It evaluates three primary options: amending the Article 22.5 listing procedure, creating a new annex for non-consensus chemicals, or increasing information exchange. The analysis highlights that creating a new annex is procedurally easier than amending the voting procedure, as it enters into force one year after adoption without requiring ratification by three-fourths of the Parties. Amending the listing procedure could lead to a complex 'two-tier' system of parallel conventions until all parties ratify the change. While aligning Annex III with other annexes would remove the consensus requirement, the report warns this might eliminate the critical role of the Chemical Review Committee (CRC).

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  • The Rotterdam Convention's effectiveness is currently hindered by a 'blockade' in listing substances in Annex III, as the process requires a consensus decision even when the Chemical Review Committee (CRC) confirms that chemicals meet scientific criteria. Examples of blocked substances include 'chrysotile asbestos, the liquid formulation of Paraquat and Fenthion'.
  • Creating a new annex is procedurally more efficient than amending the voting procedure for Annex III. A new annex enters into force 'just one year after it has been adopted' for all Parties that do not explicitly notify non-acceptance, whereas an amendment to the listing procedure requires ratification by 'at least three-fourths of the Parties'.
  • Aligning the Annex III listing process with other annexes would allow for a three-fourths majority vote and remove the ratification requirement for new listings. However, this is deemed 'unadvisable' because it would delete Article 22.5 and erase references to the CRC's review process, potentially eliminating the committee's critical scientific role.
  • Removing the consensus requirement of Article 22.5(b) could be achieved by requiring a specific majority, but this may face resistance because the current procedure does not allow parties to opt out of listing decisions. Introducing an opt-out mechanism might improve ratification chances but could 'weaken' the Convention by creating a 'multi-tier convention'.
  • If an amendment to the listing procedure is ratified by only some parties, it would create 'two parallel Conventions' and 'two alternative Annex III lists'. The 'original' list would still require consensus and bind all parties, while the 'alternative' list would apply only to those who ratified the amendment.
  • The creation of a new annex for chemicals lacking consensus would result in a 'two-tier system' where trade is governed by the new annex only between parties that have not notified non-acceptance. There is a risk that opposing parties may never ratify the new list or consent to original Annex III listings because progressive parties have their 'own' list.

Cite the original document

APA
Center for International Environmental Law (n.d.). Promoting the Effectiveness of the Rotterdam Convention: Ways Forward and Procedural Implications. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/RCEffectiveness_legal-implication-analysis_Final.pdf
Chicago
Center for International Environmental Law. Promoting the Effectiveness of the Rotterdam Convention: Ways Forward and Procedural Implications. n.d. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/RCEffectiveness_legal-implication-analysis_Final.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Center for International Environmental Law |title=Promoting the Effectiveness of the Rotterdam Convention: Ways Forward and Procedural Implications |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/RCEffectiveness_legal-implication-analysis_Final.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{centerforinternationalenvironmentallawndpromoting, author = {{Center for International Environmental Law}}, title = {{Promoting the Effectiveness of the Rotterdam Convention: Ways Forward and Procedural Implications}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/RCEffectiveness_legal-implication-analysis_Final.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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