Promoting the Effectiveness of the Rotterdam Convention: Ways Forward and Procedural Implications

This report by the Center for International Environmental Law analyzes legal and procedural options to overcome the 'blockade' in listing hazardous chemicals under Annex III of the Rotterdam Convention. It evaluates the implications of amending the existing consensus-based listing procedure versus creating a new annex to enhance the Convention's effectiveness in facilitating the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure.

• The Rotterdam Convention's current process for listing chemicals in Annex III requires a consensus decision, which has led to a 'blockade' where substances meeting scientific criteria—such as chrysotile asbestos, Fenthion, and the liquid formulation of Paraquat—cannot be listed.
• Creating a new annex is procedurally faster than amending the voting procedure for Annex III. A new annex enters into force one year after adoption for all Parties that do not explicitly notify non-acceptance, whereas an amendment to the listing procedure requires ratification by three-fourths of the Parties (118 out of 157 current Parties), a process that could take years or never occur.
• Aligning the Annex III listing process with other annexes by removing the consensus requirement and the specific procedural steps of Article 22.5 is considered unadvisable because it would eliminate the critical role of the Chemical Review Committee (CRC) in the listing procedure.
• Removing the consensus requirement of Article 22.5(b) while maintaining the rule that listings enter into force for all parties could hinder ratification. To improve the chances of entry into force, the report suggests modifying Article 22.5.c to allow parties to opt out of specific substance listings, though this would create a 'multi-tier convention'.
• Amending the listing procedure would create a period of 'parallel Conventions' until all parties ratify. During this time, an 'original' Annex III (requiring consensus) would bind all parties, while an 'alternative' Annex III (using the new voting procedure) would only apply to trade between parties that have both ratified the amendment.
• The creation of a new annex for chemicals that cannot reach consensus would allow progressive parties to move forward, but it risks permanently freezing the original Annex III if opposing parties feel no further pressure to reach consensus.

APA

Center for International Environmental Law (n.d.). Promoting the Effectiveness of the Rotterdam Convention: Ways Forward and Procedural Implications. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/RCEffectiveness_legal-implication-analysis_Final.pdf

Chicago

Center for International Environmental Law. Promoting the Effectiveness of the Rotterdam Convention: Ways Forward and Procedural Implications. n.d. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/RCEffectiveness_legal-implication-analysis_Final.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Center for International Environmental Law |title=Promoting the Effectiveness of the Rotterdam Convention: Ways Forward and Procedural Implications |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/RCEffectiveness_legal-implication-analysis_Final.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{centerforinternationalenvironmentallawndpromoting, author = {{Center for International Environmental Law}}, title = {{Promoting the Effectiveness of the Rotterdam Convention: Ways Forward and Procedural Implications}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/RCEffectiveness_legal-implication-analysis_Final.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }