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montrealpro_multifund_mar1993-17e80cc37a7f5587.pdf

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This research paper by Donald M. Goldberg of the Center for International Environmental Law argues that the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund (MPMF) provides a superior governance and administrative model for the financial mechanism of the Framework Convention on Climate Change compared to the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The author contends that the MPMF's structure ensures more equitable representation, transparency, and party-led project approval, whereas the GEF is overly dependent on World Bank management.

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  • The Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund (MPMF) is characterized by a balanced governance structure consisting of an Executive Committee with seven developed and seven developing country parties, where the chair rotates annually.
  • The MPMF provides more universal and equitable access than the GEF; all Montreal Protocol parties are eligible to participate in the MPMF, while GEF participation requires a minimum contribution of SDR 4 million (approximately US$5.7 million).
  • Project approval in the MPMF is conducted on a project-by-project basis by the Executive Committee for all projects exceeding $500,000, whereas GEF Participants only approve general work programs, leaving individual project selection and approval to implementing agencies.
  • The GEF is criticized for its lack of transparency and its heavy reliance on the World Bank, with 80 percent of its investment projects linked to regular World Bank loans and final approval resting with bank management.
  • The MPMF's financial structure is more predictable than the GEF's because contributions are based on the U.N. scale of assessments, whereas GEF contributions beyond the minimum SDR 4 million are discretionary.
  • The author argues that the MPMF model is legally compatible with the Climate Convention, suggesting that while the 'operating entity' must be an existing international entity (such as UNDP or the World Bank), the governance body (the financial mechanism) can be a separate Executive Committee subsidiary to the Conference of the Parties.

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APA
Center for International Environmental Law (n.d.). montrealpro_multifund_mar1993-17e80cc37a7f5587.pdf. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MontrealPro_MultiFund_Mar1993.pdf
Chicago
Center for International Environmental Law. montrealpro_multifund_mar1993-17e80cc37a7f5587.pdf. n.d. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MontrealPro_MultiFund_Mar1993.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Center for International Environmental Law |title=montrealpro_multifund_mar1993-17e80cc37a7f5587.pdf |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MontrealPro_MultiFund_Mar1993.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{centerforinternationalenvironmentallawndmontrealpromultifundmar199317e80cc37a7f5587pdf, author = {{Center for International Environmental Law}}, title = {{montrealpro\_multifund\_mar1993-17e80cc37a7f5587.pdf}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MontrealPro_MultiFund_Mar1993.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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