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The document analyzes a spectrum of decision-making models in international law, ranging from strict consensus to majority voting, to identify effective procedures for managing highly migratory fish stocks in the Western and Central Pacific.

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  • Strict consensus is often used for fundamental principles but can lead to "lowest common denominator" decisions in fisheries management, as it allows the most resistant participants to block restrictions.
  • The Bering Sea Pollock Convention addresses the deadlock of strict consensus by using pre-authorized default rules based on scientific assessments of pollock biomass if consensus on harvest levels and quotas fails.
  • Supermajority voting with 'opt-in' provisions is typically used for amendments to fundamental obligations, ensuring states are only bound by what they specifically agree to through ratification.
  • Opt-out mechanisms, often used for technical annexes in agreements like CITES, are generally more effective than opt-in systems because they require a party to take affirmative action to reject a new standard.
  • The 'prolepsis' or framework-then-details approach used in the Montreal Protocol allows for the adjustment of technical annexes via double majority voting, making decisions binding on all parties without opt-in or opt-out rights.
  • Double majority voting, as seen in the Montreal Protocol's Financial Mechanism, protects minority interests by requiring approval from both a majority of developing and non-developing countries.
  • The International Sea-Bed Authority employs a multiple majority system where a two-thirds Council vote can be rejected if a majority in any one of four specialized 'chambers' opposes the decision.
  • Weighted voting, used by the IMF and World Bank, is deemed unsuitable for fisheries management because there is no agreed-upon criterion for weighting (such as fleet size or historic catch) that all parties would accept.

Cite the original document

APA
Wiser, G., Porter, S., Downes, D., & Bou, A. (1999). Effective Decision-Making. Center for International Environmental Law. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/effectivedecisionmaking.pdf
Chicago
Wiser, Glenn, Steve Porter, David Downes, and Axel Bou. Effective Decision-Making. Center for International Environmental Law, 1999. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/effectivedecisionmaking.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Wiser |first1=Glenn |last2=Porter |first2=Steve |last3=Downes |first3=David |last4=Bou |first4=Axel |title=Effective Decision-Making |publisher=Center for International Environmental Law |date=January 1999 |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/effectivedecisionmaking.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{wiser1999effective, author = {Wiser, Glenn and Porter, Steve and Downes, David and Bou, Axel}, title = {{Effective Decision-Making}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {1999}, month = jan, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/effectivedecisionmaking.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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