Mythes et risques de l’Accord de Protection des Investissements entre l’UE et la Birmanie

Report an error

Summary

AI-generated

This summary is written by a language model reading the source document. It is not the publisher's words and is not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment

This policy brief contends that the EU-Myanmar Investment Protection Agreement threatens Myanmar's regulatory space and budget through investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. It concludes that the agreement could hinder democratic reforms and the peace process by allowing foreign investors to sue the government over public interest regulations.

Key insights

AI-generated

These insights are written by a language model reading the source document. They are not the publisher's words and are not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment
  • The claim that the IPA will attract massive European investment is unfounded, as research indicates that the rule of law and a solid legal framework are more significant incentives for foreign direct investment (FDI) than investment agreements.
  • The agreement's sustainable development chapter is likely ineffective because it relies on voluntary commitments and lacks binding obligations for investors or states, similar to the CETA model.
  • The IPA exposes the Myanmar government to costly lawsuits from European investors via Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, which could lead to 'regulatory chill' where the state avoids passing public interest laws to avoid litigation.
  • The financial burden of ISDS litigation—including legal fees and potential damages—could severely impact Myanmar's limited public budget, potentially diverting funds from health, education, and public services.
  • The IPA could obstruct the peace process and democratic reform by locking in current policies and making it prohibitively expensive to implement new regulations regarding natural resource sharing and land rights in ethnic regions.
  • The agreement may discourage the strengthening of Myanmar's national judicial system because it allows European investors to bypass national courts in favor of international arbitration.
  • The negotiations for the IPA have been characterized by a lack of transparency, with texts kept secret from both the public and members of the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade (INTA).

Cite the original document

APA
CCFD-Terre solidaire (2017). Mythes et risques de l’Accord de Protection des Investissements entre l’UE et la Birmanie. https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/policy_brief_eu-myanmar-fr-web-2.pdf
Chicago
CCFD-Terre solidaire. Mythes et risques de l’Accord de Protection des Investissements entre l’UE et la Birmanie. 2017. https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/policy_brief_eu-myanmar-fr-web-2.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=CCFD-Terre solidaire |title=Mythes et risques de l’Accord de Protection des Investissements entre l’UE et la Birmanie |date=October 2017 |url=https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/policy_brief_eu-myanmar-fr-web-2.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ccfdts-001273)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{ccfdterresolidaire2017mythes, author = {{CCFD-Terre solidaire}}, title = {{Mythes et risques de l’Accord de Protection des Investissements entre l’UE et la Birmanie}}, institution = {CCFD-Terre solidaire}, year = {2017}, month = oct, url = {https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/policy_brief_eu-myanmar-fr-web-2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ccfdts-001273} }

Full text

Collected · Record updated