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The author critiques the U.S.-India nuclear deal for prioritizing the geostrategic goal of balancing China over the maintenance of a rule-based nonproliferation system. While acknowledging India's global importance and the need to support its economic development, the paper argues that the deal's current form is too loose, fails to secure critical commitments from India regarding fissile material production, and risks creating precedents that other powers, including China, could exploit. The author proposes a scaled-back alternative focusing on the international supply of nuclear fuel to civilian installations rather than a total removal of technology restrictions.

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  • The U.S. strategy for the nuclear deal is based on the premise that the United States must mobilize states on China's periphery, specifically India, to balance Chinese power and enhance India's international power to achieve this goal.
  • The author argues that prioritizing the balancing of China over a rule-based nonproliferation regime is unrealistic and dangerous, as the absence of enforceable rules increases the risk of nuclear materials reaching terrorists and encourages other states to seek nuclear weapons.
  • The deal is criticized for failing to obtain a commitment from India to join the de facto moratorium on the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons, which is a practice followed by the five acknowledged nuclear weapons states.
  • The author contends that the U.S. focus on military and nuclear cooperation ignores India's more pressing needs for economic development, particularly in rural infrastructure and energy efficiency, which are the true determinants of Indian power.
  • The nonproliferation benefits of the deal, specifically putting civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, are questioned because there are no agreed criteria for how India will distinguish between civilian and military facilities.
  • The author suggests a more balanced alternative: instead of a total removal of restrictions, the U.S. should focus on changing international rules to allow the sale of nuclear fuel to Indian civilian installations.

Cite the original document

APA
Perkovich, G. (2005). Faulty Promises. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/PO21.Perkovich.pdf
Chicago
Perkovich, George. Faulty Promises. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/PO21.Perkovich.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Perkovich |first1=George |title=Faulty Promises |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=September 2005 |url=https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/PO21.Perkovich.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-003280)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{perkovich2005faulty, author = {Perkovich, George}, title = {{Faulty Promises}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2005}, month = sep, url = {https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/PO21.Perkovich.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-003280} }

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