Rules or Deals? The EU’s Challenge in Regulating Corrosive Capital in the Western Balkans
Summary
This research paper argues that foreign investments in the Western Balkans often bypass EU norms through 'corrosive capital,' which prioritizes rapid, high-visibility projects over institutional reform. The most significant finding is that the EU's reliance on persuasion and procedural critique rather than enforceable conditionality allows political elites to use foreign capital to institutionalize opacity and bypass the rule of law.
Key insights
- The Western Balkans experience a phenomenon of 'corrosive capital,' where investments exploit governance gaps in countries with weak structures and subsequently widen those gaps by encouraging local elites to prioritize visibility and rapid delivery over long-term institutional reform.
- In Montenegro, the government attempted to use a bilateral framework agreement with the UAE to place tourism and real estate projects outside the national public procurement and planning regime, effectively bypassing competitive bidding and public scrutiny.
- The Belgrade Waterfront project in Serbia exemplifies corrosive capital by using a 'project of national importance' designation and special laws to bypass urban-planning requirements, public consultation, and environmental reviews.
- The Durrës Yachts and Marina project in Albania demonstrates a transfer of risk from private investors to the state, where the government assumed the financial burden of building a replacement commercial port (Porto Romano) while granting the developer sweeping privileges.
- The development of Porto Romano in Albania has resulted in significant environmental costs, including the risk of stirring up toxic sludge and threatening biodiversity in the Fllakë Lagoon and adjacent wetlands, despite formal alignment with EU environmental directives.
- The EU's approach to these governance failures has been characterized by 'diplomatic quiet' and procedural critique in progress reports, which fails to trigger real consequences in terms of funding or conditionality.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Gjoni, I., Čukić, I., Çela, A., & Trajçe, A. (2025). Rules or Deals? The EU’s Challenge in Regulating Corrosive Capital in the Western Balkans. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Gjoni,%20%C3%84uki%C3%84,%20%C3%83ela,%20Traj%C3%83%C2%A7e%20-%20UAE%20Invesment%20in%20WB.pdf
- Chicago
- Gjoni, Iliriana, Iva Čukić, Alba Çela, and Aleksandër Trajçe. Rules or Deals? The EU’s Challenge in Regulating Corrosive Capital in the Western Balkans. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2025. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Gjoni,%20%C3%84uki%C3%84,%20%C3%83ela,%20Traj%C3%83%C2%A7e%20-%20UAE%20Invesment%20in%20WB.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Gjoni |first1=Iliriana |last2=Čukić |first2=Iva |last3=Çela |first3=Alba |last4=Trajçe |first4=Aleksandër |title=Rules or Deals? The EU’s Challenge in Regulating Corrosive Capital in the Western Balkans |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=December 2025 |url=https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Gjoni,%20%C3%84uki%C3%84,%20%C3%83ela,%20Traj%C3%83%C2%A7e%20-%20UAE%20Invesment%20in%20WB.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-003019)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{gjoni2025rules, author = {Gjoni, Iliriana and Čukić, Iva and Çela, Alba and Trajçe, Aleksandër}, title = {{Rules or Deals? The EU’s Challenge in Regulating Corrosive Capital in the Western Balkans}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2025}, month = dec, url = {https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Gjoni,%20%C3%84uki%C3%84,%20%C3%83ela,%20Traj%C3%83%C2%A7e%20-%20UAE%20Invesment%20in%20WB.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-003019} }
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