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The report analyzes Brazil's nuclear policy as a quest for technological independence and international prestige, highlighting that the country's reluctance to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol stems from a perceived injustice in the global nuclear order.

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  • Brazil's pursuit of nuclear independence is driven by negative past experiences with restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology from abroad, particularly from the United States.
  • The Brazilian Navy is the primary driver of nuclear technological advancement, providing uranium enrichment technology for the civil nuclear program and leading the development of a nuclear-powered submarine.
  • Brazil refuses to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol primarily because it views the global nuclear order as unjust, favoring nuclear-weapon states and neglecting nuclear disarmament.
  • The nuclear-powered submarine program is motivated by strategic needs to protect the coast and pre-salt oil reserves, bureaucratic interests of the Navy, and a desire for international status and prestige.
  • Brazil and Argentina transitioned from a nuclear rivalry to a cooperative relationship, establishing the ABACC (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) to verify the peaceful nature of their activities.
  • Brazil's attempt to mediate a nuclear fuel swap agreement with Iran in 2010, known as the Tehran Declaration, was rejected by the United States and other P5 members, which Brazil perceived as a dismissal of emerging powers.
  • Despite having the technology for uranium conversion and enrichment, Brazil still relies on foreign partners (such as Areva and Urenco) due to financial limitations and lack of investment in industrial-scale internal capacity.
  • The Brazilian electricity matrix is heavily dependent on hydropower (over 80%), and while the government plans to expand nuclear energy to avoid crises, political support is ambivalent, especially following the Fukushima disaster.
  • Brazil views the US-India nuclear deal as a prime example of the inconsistency and 'double standards' of the global non-proliferation regime.

Cite the original document

APA
Kassenova, T. (2014). O CALEIDOSCÓPIO NUCLEAR DO BRASIL. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/brazil_nuclear_kaleidoscope_portuguese.pdf
Chicago
Kassenova, Togzhan. O CALEIDOSCÓPIO NUCLEAR DO BRASIL. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/brazil_nuclear_kaleidoscope_portuguese.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Kassenova |first1=Togzhan |title=O CALEIDOSCÓPIO NUCLEAR DO BRASIL |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=2014 |url=https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/brazil_nuclear_kaleidoscope_portuguese.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-002551)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{kassenova2014caleidoscpio, author = {Kassenova, Togzhan}, title = {{O CALEIDOSCÓPIO NUCLEAR DO BRASIL}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2014}, url = {https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/brazil_nuclear_kaleidoscope_portuguese.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-002551} }

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