A ReSTART for U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Enhancing Security Through Cooperation

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The authors argue that the U.S. and Russia should extend New START for five years and negotiate a follow-on treaty that incorporates new technologies like hypersonic boost-glide missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes to prevent a quantitative arms race.

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  • A follow-on treaty should include intercontinental ground-launched boost-glide missiles (IGLBGMs) and nuclear-powered torpedoes (NTs), regardless of whether they are nuclear or conventionally armed, as they represent new kinds of strategic offensive arms.
  • To reduce the risk of preemptive U.S. attacks on Russia's silo-based ICBMs, a follow-on treaty should mandate a ratio between strategic deployed warheads and deployed delivery systems that is significantly lower than the 2.2:1 ratio established by New START.
  • The treaty should prohibit the research, production, flight testing, and deployment of nuclear-powered cruise missiles due to their modest military benefits compared to the high environmental risks of testing.
  • To prevent the circumvention of treaty limits, long-range air-launched ballistic and boost-glide missiles should be prohibited except when deployed on treaty-accountable heavy bombers or nonaccountable short-range tactical aircraft.
  • To resolve disputes over the conversion of SLBM launchers, the follow-on treaty should require that the length or diameter of the launch tube be reduced to render it physically incapable of accommodating an SLBM, and that inspectors be allowed to view the interior from the top.
  • New heavy bombers (such as the B-21 and PAK-DA) configured exclusively for nonnuclear operations should be exempted from accountability only if they are based at locations separate from nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
  • The authors propose a stronger 'new kinds' provision that automatically makes new strategic offensive arms accountable, applying to both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons of strategic range that emerge after negotiations.

Cite the original document

APA
Vaddi, P., & Acton, J. M. (2020). A ReSTART for U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Enhancing Security Through Cooperation. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Acton_Vaddi_ReStart.pdf
Chicago
Vaddi, Pranay, and James M. Acton. A ReSTART for U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Enhancing Security Through Cooperation. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Acton_Vaddi_ReStart.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Vaddi |first1=Pranay |last2=Acton |first2=James M. |title=A ReSTART for U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Enhancing Security Through Cooperation |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=October 2020 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Acton_Vaddi_ReStart.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-002480)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{vaddi2020restart, author = {Vaddi, Pranay and Acton, James M.}, title = {{A ReSTART for U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Enhancing Security Through Cooperation}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2020}, month = oct, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Acton_Vaddi_ReStart.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-002480} }

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